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Introduction

Those who shared Judge Friendly's concern about the consequences
2
of imposing civil liability under SEC Rule lOb-5 1 for mere negligence
have rested more easily since March 1976. In the Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder3 decision handed down on the thirtieth of that month, the
United States Supreme Court held that a damage action will not lie under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "in the absence of any allegation of
'scienter'-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 4 Seemingly, so
ended much rhetorical conflict among the lower courts 5 and a fruitful
I. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the '34
Act]. The text of § 10 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Note that, absent SEC promulgation of appropriate rules, section 10(b) is sterile. The text of
Rule lOb-5 [hereinafter referred to as Rule lOb-5 or simply lOb-5] is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 866 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
3. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, petition for rehearing denied, 425 U.S.
986 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Ernst & Ernst].
4. Id. at 193 (footnotes omitted).
5. Prior to the Ernst & Ernst decision, several courts of appeals had ruled that some
degree of scienter had to be established before civil liability would be imposed under Rule
lOb-5. See, e.g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974) ("there is required
something additional by way of scienter or conscious fault than mere negligence"); Cohen
v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 1973) (the "standard for determining liability
under Rule lOb-5 essentially is whether plaintiff has established that defendant either knew
the material facts that were misstated or omitted and should have realized their significance,

source of comment.6
On the other hand, the Court's opinion gave cause for unrest to those
who believed that "[tihe great scienter debate does not extend [to suits
for equitable relief]. "7 Writing for a majority of six in Ernst & Ernst,
Justice Powell explicitly refrained from discussing whether scienter is an
element necessary to injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule lOb5.8 Avoiding comment was quite appropriate because this issue was not
before the Court.9 The point of the reservation was, however, severely
undercut by the following statement: "[W]e are quite unwilling to extend
the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." 10 Although unnecessary to
the fundamental holding, this remark is of a sweep unlikely to be ignored
by defendants in equitable proceedings predicated on 1Ob-5.
The tenor of these words and of other portions of the opinion has
already led district courts to declare that defendants' intent is among the
elements to be adduced by SEC in enforcement actions invoking 1Ob-5. "l
Other courts, 2 including the First and Second Circuits,' 3 have stated that
14
negligence will continue to suffice.
or failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts when they were readily available to
him and he had reasonable grounds to believe that they. . . existed. It is not enough. . . to
show that defendant failed to detect . . . material facts when he had no reason to suspect
their existence."); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971)
("[ilt is insufficient to allege mere negligence").
Other courts of appeals held that mere negligence would suffice. See, e.g., White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967) ("[p]roof of 'scienter,' . . . is not required under section
10(b) of the Act"); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) ("the statute was
meant to cover more than deliberately and dishonestly misreprenting or omitting material
facts which ordinarily are badges of fraud and deceit."); Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) ("Rule lOb-5(b), a proper implementation of section 10(b), only
requires proof of a material misstatement or an omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security to make out a prima facie case").
6. See, e.g., 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW, FRAUD § 8.4 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as BROMBERG]; Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972); Jacobs,
What is A Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOb-5?, 42 FORD. L. REV. 243
(1973); Mann, Rule l0b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch
Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970).
7. De Lancey, Rule lOb-5-A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1367 (1970).
8. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 214 (footnote omitted).
11. SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977); SECv. Bausch
& Lomb, 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See notes 303-06 and 269-75 and accompanying text infra.
12. SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. J.S. Love & Assoc., 422 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum); SEC v.
Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum). See notes 297-302 and 270
infra.
13. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976). See notes 276-96 and accompanying text
infra.
14. Subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), SEC filed a motion for "summary reversal" in SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Notice of Motion of Securities
and Exchange Commission for Summary Reversal of the Order of Final Judgment, and for
Remand to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 76-

Engendering further uncertainty, Ernst & Ernst did not clarify the
type of conduct that satisfies the scienter burden imposed on plaintiffs in
private damage actions brought under 1Ob-5. It remains uncertain
whether recklessness 1 5 or, in the words of then Judge Cardozo in the
classic Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co. decision, 16 "at least" gross
neglect may be equated with intent for purposes of lOb-5 cases that would
otherwise require plaintiff to prove scienter. 1 7 As a result, petitions for
equitable relief under lOb-5 pose at least one, possibly two, questions: Is
scienter a required element of proof? If so, what species of conduct
constitutes "scienter"? The second of these is presented in all lOb-5
damage actions.
Clearly the pendulum has swung since various commentators recognized a trend against requiring proof of intent to mislead in 1Ob-5 damage
actions, 18 but it is not clear how far it has swung. If the Court intended
neither to burden plaintiffs with proving defendants' intent to deceive as a
prerequisite for equitable relief under Rule 1Ob-5 nor to exclude use of
"at least" recklessness in lieu of such intent, then Justice Powell's
opinion will be troublesome indeed and cause much unnecessary litigation. 1 9 Until the Court has an opportunity to pass on these points, we can
6189 (filed Jan. 3, 1977). The authors do not anticipate a decision until the fall of 1977. See
notes 269-75 and accompanying text infra.
15. In the same footnote in which Justice Powell defined scienter, for purposes of the
case, as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," he observed
that
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here
the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Id. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
Subsequent to its reversal in Ernst & Ernst, the Seventh Circuit held "that 'reckless
conduct' can be sufficient to constitute scienter," Sanders v. John Nuveen A. Co., Inc., 554
F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Wright v. The Heizer Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,101 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir. 1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976). The Seventh Circuit
may, however, be engaged in forcing the Supreme Court to review its predicates or, at least,
its formulations since the lower court has also held that § 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1970), set forth at length in note 67 infra, requires proof of
scienter "for the same reasons" articulated in the Supreme Court's Ernst & Ernst assessment of the comparative burdens borne by plaintiffs under §§ II and 12 of the '33 Act.
Sanders v. Nuveen, 554 F.2d at 796. This ignores that the Supreme Court addressed lOb-5 as
a rule, rather than as a statute, and looked to the meaning of § 10(b).
Furthermore, focusing on Rule lOb-5, the Seventh Circuit also maintains,
In view of the . . .analysis [in Ernst & Ernst] of the statutory scheme of
implied private remedies and express remedies, the definition of 'reckless behavior' should not be a liberal one lest any discernible distinction between 'scienter'
and 'negligence' be obliterated for these purposes. We believe 'reckless' in these
circumstances comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater
degree of ordinary negligence. We perceive it to be not just a difference in degree,
but also in kind.
Sanders v. Nuveen, 554 F.2d at 793. The authors contend that the Supreme Court's
reference to express remedies was poorly made. See notes 65-66 and 193-207 and accompanying text infra.
16. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
17. Id. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449.
18. See, e.g., 2 BROMBERG, supra note 6, § 8.4 at 501.
19. It may be that the Court belatedly senses this. Note that in Santa Fe Industries,

anticipate numerous additional installments in the saga of exploring what
degree of culpability is implicit in the current version of Rule 10b-5. 20
In discussing whether scienter ought to be an element of proof in
enforcement proceedings under 10b-5, this article considers not only
Ernst & Ernst and decisions attempting to interpret and apply the case,
but also examines the treatment of culpability in analogous cases at
common law and in equity, as well as provisions of both of the principal
federal securities laws and other regulatory schemes that are conceptually
related to section 10(b) and its dependents. The point is not to maintain
that Ernst & Ernst was wrongfuly decided, although the authors admit a
conviction that the grounds adduced for the holding do not support it.
Rather, the authors find the language of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
relatively clear, unambiguous, and quite susceptible of constitutional
application without imposing on plaintiffs the burden to prove intent to
defraud on the part of those who use provably deceptive techniques in
securities transactions. They submit that the rhetoric of the majority
opinion in Ernst & Ernst represents over-reaction to judicially-encouraged over-extension of lOb-5 in years past when, all too frequently,
duty and causation analyses were abridged.
Retention of "at least" gross neglect as an element that can be
substituted for subjectively-oriented scienter in assessing legal or equitable liability under Rule 1Ob-5 is entirely consistent with a proper legislative purpose of the '34 Act. Historically, such purposes have been
presumed to include protection of investors from over-reaches, intentional or not, by those with access to superior data bases, who not only have
placed themselves in a position of responsibility to disseminate or withhold information from a particularized audience, reasonably perceived as
such, but who also hold themselves out, by occupation of office or
otherwise, as competent to assume this responsibility. Indeed, retention
of mere neglect in performance of the public duty addressed by section
10(b) as a standard that can be substituted for subjectively-oriented
scienter in assessing whether to grant equitable relief under Rule 1Ob-5,
would also be entirely consistent with this legislative purpose. Pursuant to
this standard, those who have assumed such responsibility and have been
careless of their duty to acquit it, notwithstanding the likelihood of injury
to investors who lack authoritative access to data, could be held liable
without further proof of intent. This would seem equally true whether the
responsibility was to discriminate between data or to formulate disclosures, or both.
Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977), Ernst & Ernst is described as "holding that a cause of
Id. at 1300 (emphasis
action under Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence .....
added).
20. The word "current" is used advisedly, since SEC has the authority to amend the
Rule and might make a substantial contribution by doing so.

The authors are quite disturbed with the Supreme Court's subjective
approach in Ernst & Ernst to the determination of whether a particular
device or contrivance is deceptive. Unfortunately this approach might be
deemed meaningful outside the context of lOb-5 damage actions and
cause mischief in connection with proxy solicitation, textile fiber identification, wool product labelling, food and drug and similar regulatory
schemes.
II.

Nonstatutory Remedies for Misrepresentation

Notwithstanding the federal securities laws, a plaintiff who seeks
relief for misrepresentation may sue at either law for damages or for
equitable relief.2 Although the common law of misrepresentation continues to grow,22 it is important to contrast the degrees of culpability
23
traditionally required at law and in equity as a condition to relief.
A.

Remedies at Law

The common law of misrepresentation can be said to have originated
in the action for deceit. As a general proposition, deceit requires proof
that defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact upon which
plaintiff justifiably relied to his damage. Whether defendant's knowledge
must be actual or can be imputed because of defendant's ignorance
achieved or maintained through breach of a duty to inquire is not subject
to dispute. 24 Threatening images associated with imprecise and colloquial
21. The particular form of relief granted by equity might be almost anything
appropriate to the particular case; but the most common remedies for misrepresentation were recission or reformation of a contract between the parties, or
requiring a defendant who had been unjustly enriched to hold the money or
porperty he had received subject to a constructive trust, or an equitable lien.
W.L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 687 (4th ed. 1971) (citations omitted) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
22. In addition to having a remedy at law for what amounts to negligent misrepresentation (see notes 31-32 and accompanying text infra), certain circumstances may permit a
plaintiff to pursue a cause of action at law for misrepresentation on a strict liability theory.
PROSSER, supra note 21, § 107, at 710. The theory of strict liability is beyond the scope of
this article and will not be discussed.
23. Following the Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst, at least three courts that have
considered the role of due diligence defenses have made a similar examination of the
common law of misrepresentation. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591
(3d Cir. 1976).
24. In an action for deceit, the essential allegations are: (1) . . . specific false
representations of material facts; (2) the scienter that the defendant knew his
statements to be untrue; (3) . . . [the representations] were believed to be true by
the plaintiff and were relied upon by him; (4). . . plaintiff acted thereon; (5)...
plaintiff suffered damages by such action . . . . While it is not necessary to
charge an intent to defraud, it should appear that the representations were
intended or calculated to influence the plaintiff to act upon them.
B.J. SIIIPMAN, ON COMMON LAW PLEADING § 97 (Ballantine 3d ed. 1923)(emphasis added).
But see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1431 (2d ed. 1961)[hereinafter cited as Loss]
where it is stated that among the "hornbook 'elements' " of deceit is the element that
"defendant must know of the falsity (scienter) but make the statement nevertheless for the
purpose of inducing. . . plaintiff to rely on it .... ." (emphasis added)
Professor Loss' synopsis should be considered in context of a writer well predating
him:

uses of the words "fraud" and "deceit' '25 have not aided in understanding that misrepresentation predicated on such a breach is comprehended
26
within the cause of action.
A famous and sometimes miscited decision by the House of Lords,
Derry v. Peek ,27 definitively stated the elements necessary to sustain a
common law action for deceit. Plaintiff purchased stock in a traction
company in reliance on a statement in a prospectus issued by defendants
that the company enjoyed the right to use "steam or mechanical motor
power" over its right of way. The company had no such right, and
plaintiff brought an action in deceit. Concluding that defendants were
merely negligent in making the untrue statement, the House of Lords
ruled that, absent evidence demonstrating that a false statement was made
"(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly,
careless whether it be true or false," 28 a deceit action would not lie.
In Derry v. Peek an honest though incorrect belief as to a statement's
truth was held insufficient to support an action sounding in deceit. The
quoted language, however, indicated that an action could have been
grounded on material misrepresentation by a defendant who was indifferent to truth or falsity of his statement. Thus, the case teaches equality in
liability for those who, cognizant of their own ignorance, affirm what
So if the Vendor affirm that the Goods are the Goods of a Stranger, his Friend,
and that he had an Authority from him to sell them, whereas in truth they are the
Goods of another, and he had no such Authority, an Action [in deceit] will lie
against him; and in such Case it will be sufficient for the Buyer to prove them the
Goods of another, without proving that the Defendant knew them to be so;...
and doubtless, proving them to be the Goods of another would be Evidence prima
facie that he had no Authority, and sufficient to put him upon proving that he had.
F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NIsi PRIus 30-31 (H.
Gaine 1788). Another example is even more pointed.
But if a Merchant sell one Kind of Silk for another, whereby the Purchaser is
imposed upon in the Value, he may bring his Action; and though it appear upon
Evidence that there was no actual Deceit in the Merchant, but that it was in the
Factor beyond Sea; yet it will be sufficient to charge the Defendant ....
Id. at 31 (emphasis added). See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1509 (1920) concerning
liability in deceit of one who supposes that his representations are true, but lacks a basis for
such supposition and, nonetheless, makes them to induce another's reliance.
In Ernst & Ernst, the Supreme Court looked to a standard dictionary of the time at
which the '34 Act was adopted for meanings of the words "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance." 425 U.S. at 199 nn.20 & 21. It is interesting to observe that a legal dictionary
of the period reported,
To constitute 'deceit' the statement must be untrue, made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, . . . made with intent
that plaintiff act thereon or in a manner appropriatelyfitted to induce him to act
thereon ....

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (emphasis added).
25. In his treatise, Dean Prosser indicates that the law of misrepresentation is somewhat confused. He attributes this to a large degree to the "indiscriminate use of the word
'fraud,' a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case." PROSSER supra
note 21, § 105, at 684; accord, 2 BROMBERG, supra note 6, § 8.4, at 110.
26. Some courts have held that a fraud action lies against a person who "innocently
misrepresents a material fact by mistake," E.g., Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696, 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). This, however, is not the predominant view.
27. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
28. Id. at 374 (emphasis added). This was not new law. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 131-34 (1881); T.M. COOLEY, TORTS 585 (Ist ed. 1880).

they do not know to be true with those who state what they know to be
untrue.
Leading American cases conceptually related to Derry v. Peek are
Glanzer
v. Shepard29 and Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven &
30
Co.
In Glanzer, plaintiffs purchased several hundred bags of beans from
a seller who hired defendants, public weighers, to do the necessary
weighing. Payment was to be on a weight basis, and seller instructed the
weighers to deliver certified weight statements to plaintiffs as well as to
seller. The weight of the beans was later discovered to be considerably
less than certified by defendants. Plaintiffs sued, alleging injury as a
result of defendants' negligent misrepresentation of the weight.
Writing for the New York Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo declared that defendants had a common law duty, which extended to
plaintiffs, to weigh the beans carefully. Brushing aside defendants' argument that their duty did not extend to plaintiff-buyers but only to the seller
who hired them, Cardozo wrote,
[Defendants] knew that the beans had been sold, and that on the
faith of their certificate payment would be made. They sent a
copy to the plaintiffs for the very purpose of inducing action.
• * . In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the
benefit of all whose conduct was to be governed.3
Liability was thus imposed because defendants knew exactly who would
be relying on their certificates and should have appreciated that plaintiffs
would be injured if the beans were inaccurately weighed.32
Nine years later, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. ,
which dealt with a transaction conceptually closer to securities than
beans, Judge Cardozo refused to expand the negligence principle enunciated in Glanzer. Defendants were a firm of certified public accountants
retained by Fred Stern & Co. to prepare and certify its balance sheet. The
accountants were aware that copies of the certified balance sheet would
be used in some type of financial dealings, but knew neither the nature of
the dealings nor who would rely on the balance sheet. In making substantial loans to the Stern Company which subsequently went bankrupt,
plaintiff relied on defendants' report. The balance sheet had grossly
overstated the Stern Company's assets. Plaintiff demanded that defendants be held liable for the inaccurate statement on the theory of either
negligent or fraudulant misrepresentation.
29. 233 N.Y. 236, 136 N.E. 275 (1922).
30. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
31. 233 N.Y. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276 (emphasis added).
32. In 1963, the House of Lords decided that an action for negligent misrepresentation
could be maintained in those situations in which a "special relation" existed between the
parties. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1964] App. Cas. 465.
33. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).

The court of appeals refused to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation. Judge Cardozo distinguished Glanzer on the ground that in
Ultramares the defendants performed their service primarily for the
benefit of their client and "only incidentally or collaterally for the use of
34
those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit it thereafter."
Although the accountants were aware that someone would make use of
the statement, inability reasonably to foresee that a particular plaintiff or
group of plaintiffs would rely on it in making a loan precluded imposition
of liability for negligence in its preparation. 3 5 Cardozo remarked that if a
different result were reached, a thoughtless slip or blunder might expose
accountants to liability "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
36
time to an indeterminate class."
Although refusing to impose liability on a negligence theory, the
court held that an action for common-law fraud would lie. Noting that
"[f]raud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is
none," 37 Judge Cardozo stated that "negligence or blindness, even when
not equivalent to fraud is none the less evidence to sustain an inference of
fraud. At least this is so if the negligence is gross." 38 After reviewing the
facts, he concluded that a jury could reasonably find defendants' negligence to be so great as to warrant a finding of willful fault "since there
was notice in the circumstances of. . .[the statement's] making that [the
client] did not intend to keep it to himself." ,39 Thus, while Judge Cardozo
refused to impose liability for negligence on a defendant who could not
reasonably foresee which plaintiff or group of plaintiffs would rely on his
statement n0 he nevertheless solidified the principle that, for the tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation, "at least" a person's gross neglect of the
truth of his representations will substitute for guilty knowledge if they
prove to be untrue.4 1
34. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446 (emphasis added).
35. Arguing as amicus curiae in Ernst & Ernst, SEC proposed a similar analysis.
Arguing to retain a negligence standard in actions brought pursuant to Rule lOb-5, SEC
stated that liability should not be imposed if defendant did not know of and could not
reasonably forsee plaintiff's reliance. 425 U.S. at 198 n.18.
36. 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 444. Note Justice Powell's adoption of the same type
of argument in Ernst & Ernst. 425 U.S. at 214-16 n.33.
37. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
38. Id. at 190-91, 174 N.E. at 449 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
40. Dean Prosser is not entirely persuaded by this distinction. He states,
Certificates of expert examination are intended to be exhibited, not hidden under
a bushel; and a rule which denies recovery because the defendant who has
provided one for such a purpose does not know the plaintiff's name, or the
particulars of the transaction, has a very artificial aspect.
PROSSER, supra note 21, § 107, at 709.
41. 255 N.Y. at 192-93, 174 N.E. at 449. A later case, also decided by the New York
Court of Appeals, re-emphasized this analysis.
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently
gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose
liability for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet . ...
[Hieedlessness and reckless disregard of consequences may take the place of
deliberate intention.
State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, 15 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938).

B.

Equitable Remedies

Courts of equity originally assumed jurisdiction over misrepresentation cases to remedy injustices that were otherwise perpetrated by law
courts' refusal to grant relief for certain misrepresentations. Equitable
relief from the consequences visited upon a party to a sale by the other
party's misrepresenation is available on terms somewhat easier than a
remedy at law. When materiality of a misrepresentation is demonstrated,
plaintiff establishes a case for rescission by proving that he relied to his
detriment on the seller's untrue statement.4 2 Proof of seller's intent to
mislead the buyer is not required as a condition to such relief.43
Turning from rescission to equitable accounting, a comparable insensitivity to malefactors' state of mind is apparent. This is clearly
evident in the area of insider trading. Even though profits are derived from
strangers, "there can be no justification for permitting officers and
directors . . . to retain for themselves profits which . . . they derived
solely from exploiting information gained by virtue of . . . [being
functional insiders]."I Neither damage to plaintiff corporation, in the
sense of a taking or destruction of quantifiable assets, nor intent to
deprive it of an opportunity to profit need be proven. 45 Focus is upon the
nature of the opportunity, the enterprise's normal expectations as to it,
and the duty of the insider who made personal use of it.'
C. Summary
It is clear that the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst sets a
standard for liability in damage actions brought under Rule lOb-5 that is
closer to the standard for intentional misrepresentation. The language of
the decision suggests, however, that section 10(b), heretofore regarded
by some as a "catch-all" less rigorous than common-law fraud, is more
rigorous-at least with respect to the requirement of scienter. Justice
42. See Canadian Agency, Ltd. v. Assets Realization Co., 165 App. Div. 96, 150
N.Y.S. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
43. Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 7, 159 N.E. 700, 702
(1928). Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N.Y. 375, 380, 118 N.E. 855, 856 (1918) where it was
stated,
An action may be maintained in equity to rescind a transaction which has
been consummated through misrepresentation of material facts not amounting to
fraud. Unlike an action at law for damages, intentional misstatements need not be
proved. (citations omitted)
Accord, Woods-Faulkner & Co. v. Michelson, 63 F,2d 569, 572 (8th Cir. 1933).
44. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d 910-12, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 81 (1969).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c at 204-05 (1958). This same
rationale is also applicable to the more obvious forms of usurpation of enterprise opportunity, such as the acquisition of a complementary technology or business, development of a
new line of business, acquisition of a new plant site, or other diversion of opportunities
rightfully belonging to the complaining corporation.
46. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d
121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935); Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479,
121 A.2d 919 (1956); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).

Powell's concentration on the "mental state" 47 of a user of "manipulative or deceptive" practices, rather than the nature of the practices
themselves, seems to imply that use of indisputably deceptive devices
will be immunized unless prosecutors can prove the user's evil motive or,
possibly, recklessness. So, concern with "mental state" marks a retreat
from rules of liability based on objective manifestations into a realm of
moral judgments similar to that from which the common law evolved to a
more socially useful state. The House of Lords avoided such a retreat in
Derry v. Peek by recognizing that one who makes an untrue statement
without belief in its truth, or. . . recklessly, careless whether it
be true or false [is just as fraudulent as if he had knowingly
stated that which was false] . . . . [I]f fraud be proved, the
motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not
that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom
the statement was made~g.
It must be recognized, however, that section 10(b) is a statute and is
therefore incapable of application beyond its bounds. The Supreme Court
may have feared that those bounds had been reached. Or, it may have
believed, as the Ernst & Ernst majority opinion seems to stress, that the
adjectives "manipulative" and "deceptive" used in section 10(b) truly
require some proof of evil motive before liability can be imposed. Or, the
Court's choice of language may have been imprecise. One hopes that the
first or third of these alternatives is the proper explanation. In any event,
it must be stressed that, unlike law, equity does not require proof of any
form of scienter before relief is granted. Assuming materiality can be
established, all that equity demands is that plaintiff demonstrate detrimental reliance on the untrue statement. Since private equity actions for
misrepresentation and 1Ob-5 enforcement proceedings are so closely
analogous, 49 a strong argument can be made that neither scienter nor the
47. "In this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12
(emphasis added). See notes 169-76 and accompanying text infra.
48. 14 App. Cas. 337,374 (1889) (emphasis added). See notes 27-28 and accompanying
text supra.
49. In granting relief for misrepresentation, equity is primarily concerned with the
injustice that will result from allowing defendant to keep what he has gained by his
misrepresentation, rather than with punishment.
The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish. The essence
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944). An SEC enforcement action brought
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is intended primarily to protect investors from wrongful
conduct rather than punish the defendant for his violation of the statute and the Rule. See
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
Since this article does not treat SEC administrative proceedings as such, it is pertinent
to observe that respondents in such cases, to the degree they are charged with violation of

more specific "intent to deceive" should be an element of proof in the
latter.
Before proceeding to further discussion of whether scienter or "intent to deceive" should be an element of proof in an enforcement action,
a brief look at the statutory context in which section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
exist is appropriate.
III.
A.

Statutory Framework of the Securities Laws
Securities Act of 1933

A principal purpose of the Securities Act of 193350 was to provide an
opportunity for potential investors to evaluate information material to
issuance and public sale of certain securities. 5 1 The '33 Act accomplishes
this purpose primarily through requirements for prior registration 52 and
distribution of a prospectus concerning nonexempt securities offerings.5 3
To coerce compliance with its provisions, the '33 Act explicitly
provides for private actions for damages or rescission, 54 administrative
proceedings and orders, 5 5 criminal penalties, 5 6 and enforcement proceedgenerically-termed antifraud provisions of the securities acts, can be expected to argue that
the prosecution has the burden of proving scienter la Ernst & Ernst. SEC has already
rejected one such effort. See In re Steadman, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,243.
A current petition for certiorari, in which petitioner questions whether issuance of an
injunction for violation of § 5(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970), can be predicated
on negligence alone, makes just such an attack, although in a different arena. Homans v.
SEC, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), pet. for cert., Dkt. No. 76-1798 (Sup. Ct. June 17, 1977).
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the '33 Act].
51. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme
Court developed a test to limit those situations in which an investment that otherwise
superficially satisfies the statutory definition of "security" falls within the purview of the
'33 Act.
The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entreprenurial or
managerial efforts of others.
Id. at 852. In addition §§ 3 and 4 of the '33 Act exempt certain securities and certain
transactions from the requirements of the statute. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1970). For
purposes of this article it will be assumed that jurisdictional requirements have been
satisfied in the discussed cases.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f (1970).
53. Id.§ 77g.
54. Id.§§ 77k, 771, 77o.
55. Id.at 77h. The commission's ability to postpone the effective date of a pending
registration statement is based on the premise that the registration statement is "on its face
incomplete or inaccurate in any respect .... " Id. This procedure is rarely used because of
the practice of submitting admittedly incomplete registration statements to elicit SEC staff
comments and pave the way for filing a registration statement suitable to the SEC so that the
effective date may be accelerated. SEC may issue a stop order that suspends effectiveness
of a registration statement if the statement includes "any untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
" Id. Note that the section does not require proof
statements therein not misleading ....
of intent to deceive on the part of registrant.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970). This section provides in pertinent part,
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter
. . . or any person who willfully in a registration statement. . . makes any untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading [may be
fined or imprisoned]. (emphasis added)
Obviously "willfully" implies something more than mere negligence or recklessness.

ings initiated by the SEC. 57 In addition, certain sections of the '33 Act have
been construed to imply a private cause of action. 58 Only the express and
implied civil remedies will be examined in this section.
6
59
1. Express Civil Remedies.-Sections 11, 12(2), 0 and 1561 of
the '33 Act expressly provide for civil liability. None of them requires
plaintiff to prove scienter or, for that matter, neglect. Rather, each
contemplates imposition of liability in a manner comparable to strict
liability in tort for defective products, since liability flows from existence
of a material defect offensive to one or more of these sections. 62 Affirmative defenses are explicitly enumerated for certain defendants. 63 Thus,
some may escape liability otherwise imposed by proving that, despite
exercise of due diligence, they did not know of the material misstatement
or omission constituting the defect.64
If one chooses to assume that the truly innocent will always be able
to perfect such an affirmative defense, then it can be said, as did Justice
57. Id. § 77t(b).
58. E.g., 15 U.SC. 77q(a) (1970). See notes 67-76 and accompanying text infra.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
60. Id. § 771(2).
61. Id. § 77o.
62. Issuers of securities for which a registration statement is effective, as well as other
persons engaged in the registration process, are subject to liability in damages under section
II if the statement contained "an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statement therein not
misleading ....
" 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Liability of the issuer is absolute unless it can
prove that plaintiff had knowledge of the relevant falsity or omission at the time he
purchased. Defendants other than the issuer may avoid liability by proving lack of personal
knowledge of the misrepresentation and what amounts to due diligence in their role in the
registration process. Plaintiff need prove only the misstatement or omission and its materiality; he need not prove defendant's fault, whether calculated or negligent. Indeed,
plaintiff need not prove reliance until the issuer has published financial statements that
cover a full year following the effective date of the registration statement.
Section 12 provides for damages or rescission in two situations. Section 12(1) addresses
those who offer, sell, or deliver securities in violation of the registration requirements. The
only defense under § 12(1) is proof of registration or statutory exemption from registration.
15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970). Section 12(2) relates to anyone who offers or sells a security "by
means of a prospectus or oral communication" either including a misstatement of material
fact or omission of a "material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading [to the purchaser who does not
know of the untruth or omission]." Id. § 771(2). The defendant will be held liable unless he
proves that "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission." Id. Section 12(2), therefore, does not require plaintiff to
prove either his own reliance or defendant's knowledge and intent.
Section 15 provides that any person who controls a person liable under § II or § 12
is jointly and severally liable with the controlled person unless he, the controller, had "no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in" the existence of the situation that gives
rise to the underlying liability. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
63. No affirmative defense is provided for an issuer in an action brought under section
11.
64. Availability of the affirmative defense in § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970), has led
to observations that § 12(2) imposes "some form of the traditional scienter requirement."
Barnes v. Osopsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir, 1967). This is true only to the extent that one
ignores the significant difference between a plaintiff who must prove scienter and a defendant who must negate it. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953) (dictum).

Powell in Ernst & Ernst, that sections 11 and 12(2) define liability for
intentional or negligent misstatement or omission.6 5 But this seems a bit
Pollyannaish 66 and may confuse the unwary. The point of each express
liability section of the '33 Act is to hold defendants liable for manifestations misleading in effect and to excuse only those who successfully carry
the burden of proving lack of personal responsibility for such effect.
2. Implied Civil Remedies.-Included in the enforcement
framework for enforcing compliance with the provisions of the '33 Act is
section 17(a), 67 which closely resembles Rule lOb-5. 68 Like section 5(a)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 69 section 17(a) characterizes
certain conduct as "unlawful." All three provisions contemplate enforcement by a specialized agency. Unlike section 5(a), however, both Rule
65. See 425 U.S. at 208 (by implication).
66. E.H. PORTER, POLLYANNA, THE FIRST GLAD BOOK (1913). Pollyanna was a character who could discern the good in any given disaster. She would have taken the "Which do
you want first, the good news or the bad news?" jokes quite literally and accepted the
"good news" with unreserved delight.
67.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as § 17(a)].
68. One leading commentator made it clear that this was no accident because the
author of Rule l0b-5 "put [section 17(a) of the '33 Act and section l0b of the '34 Act]
together, and the only discussion [he and a collaborator] had was where 'in connection with
the purchase or sale' should be...
" Conference on Codification of the FederalSecurities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton Freeman).
While the provisions are substantially similar, an important distinction must be observed. Section 17(a) is a statute while Rule lOb-5 is a rule promulgated pursuant to statute.
Thus, the Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst does not necessarily bear directly on section
17(a). This is not to say that defendants have not tried to apply the rationale of Ernst &
Ernst to § 17(a). In SEC v.World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1976),
defendants argued that, because the language of both § 17(a) and Rule lOb-5 is very similar
and because Ernst & Ernst interpreted the rule as requiring scienter, § 17(a) should be
similarly interpreted. The FirstCircuit dismissed this argument as a nonsequitur.
Both the district court in SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D.
Va. 1977), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977), relying on different parts of the Ernst & Ernst opinion, have
declared that proof of scienter is required before liability will be imposed under section
17(a).
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst stated that
subsection 2 and arguably subsection 3 of the rule "could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the
effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not." 425 U.S. at
212. Since the language of § 17(a) and Rule lOb-5 are so similar, this statement gives added
support to the proposition that § 17(a) proscribes negligent as well as intentional conduct.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FTCA]. Section 5(a)
[hereinafter referred to as § 5(a)] states, "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."

lOb-5 and section 17(a) have been held to imply a private cause of
action.7 0
Section 17(a) proscribes in the disjunctive certain activities performed directly or indirectly "in the offer or sale" of securities.'7 1 Subsection
17(a)(1) clearly addresses the actor's state of mind. 72 On the other hand,
subsection 17(a)(3) deals with those who "engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser. 7 3 Ordinarily this wording would seem to
warrant concentration on effects experienced or likely to be experienced
by purchasers, just as FTCA section 5(a) proscribes "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" 74 without dwelling on the intention of the actor. 75 The
logic of decisions holding that FTCA section 5(a) provides a sufficiently
definite standard for Trade Commission orders76 would seem to support
an interpretation that section 17(a)(3) of the '33 Act constitutes an
appropriate standard, at least for courts sitting in equity.
The language of subsection 17(a)(2) is remarkably different from
that of the other two subsections. Rather than dealing with offeror's
purpose as does subsection (1), or the effect of his business practices as
does subsection (3), subsection (2) focuses on how "money or other
property" is obtained. It proscribes doing so "by means of any untrue
statement of . . . or. . .omission [of] a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
70. An implied private right of action under Rule lob-5 was acknowledged in the
following cases: Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
An implied private right of action under § 17(a) was acknowledged in the following
cases: Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Dack v. Shauman, 227 F.
Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
That FTCA § 5(a) is not one of the "antitrust laws" for violation of which private
suitors have a remedy pursuant to §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(1970), was recognized in Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); Holloway
v. Bristol-Myers, 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It
should be noted, however, that lessening this comparison, § I of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1970), defines "antitrust laws" to include the Sherman Act, parts of the Wilson
Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act, which according to the Supreme Court is "exclusive."
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); see note 67 supra. Application of section 17(a), like
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, is not limited to registered securities.
72. See note 67 supra. It is important to note that knowledge may be inferred when the
supposed lack of knowledge consists of ignorance of facts that any ordinary person under
similar circumstances should have known. United States v. Vassen, 222 F.2d 3, 8 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955); Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
This is somewhat similar to the analysis adopted by Judge Cardozo in the deceit portion of
his decision in Ultramares. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 67 supra.
74. See note 69 supra.
75. Indeed, under section 17(a) proof of actual victimization is not required in an SEC
enforcement proceeding. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1939); SEC v. Torr,
15 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937).
76. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. LePeyre, 366 F.2d
117 (5th Cir. 1966).

which they were made, not misleading .

.

..

t,77 It would seem that

determination of whether a statement is true or whether an omission has
caused statements to be misleading cannot be constrained by reference to
the knowledge or intention of the individual who has disseminated the
information. In broad terms, a statement is either true or it is not true.
Whether an omission has caused a statement to be misleading relates to
the understanding of people who rely or who will rely on the statement
rather7 than to the mental state of the person responsible for the omission. 78
From this it might be asserted that section 17(a) characterizes certain
securities transactions as unlawful per se if the offeror manifests a
purpose to defraud, obtains property through use of material misrepresentations, or otherwise so conducts himself that reasonable purchasers are
79
actually or potentially misled to their damage in material particulars.
Although Ernst & Ernst ordains that such an analysis cannot be applied to
Rule 1Ob-5 in civil damage actions, arguably a similar analysis should be
used in SEC enforcement actions brought under the Rule.
B.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The focus of the '34 Act differs from that of the '33 Act. The
principal thrust of the '34 Act is regulation of the marketplace for
77. See note 67 supra.
78. In this respect § 17(a)(2) is not unlike the misbranding concept explicitly
articulated in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law and other statutes (e.g., the Textile Fiber
Identification and Wool Products Acts, 15 U.S.C. 88 70 & 68 (1970)) that seek to protect
consumers against being effectively misled, whether through misrepresentation or omission,
without necessary reference to the mental state of sellers or others who are legally responsible. Section 403 of the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1970), provides, for
example, that "[flood shall be deemed to be misbranded-(a) If its labeling is false or
misleading in any particular. (b) If its container is so made, formed, or filled as to be
misleading." Section 301 of the same Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970), prohibits introduction of
misbranded food into commerce. The Supreme Court has said that these
comprehensive terms condemn every statemfent, design and device which may
mislead or deceive. Deception may result from the use of statements not technically false or which may be literally true. The aim of the statute is to prevent that
resulting from indirection and ambiguity, as well as from statements which are
false. (emphasis added)
United States v. 95 Barrels Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1924).
Subsequent to the Ernst & Ernst decision, however, at least two courts held that
scienter is essential to plaintiff's case in damage actions laid under section 17(a)(2). See
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1977); Malik v. Universal
Resources Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Cal. 1976). In Malik, the court noted that Ernst&
Ernst had "greatly simplified" the necessary analysis and "[wlhile granting that the precise
language of § 17(a)(2) does not so clearly as § 10(b) bespeak a Congressional intent to reach
only purposeful wrongdoing, . . . at least with respect to civil claims, scienter is also an
essential element of proof under § 17(a)." Id. at 363 (emphasis added). Apparently the
courts missed Justice Powell's admission that, were it not for the administrative history of
Rule 1Ob-5, its subsection (b), which was copied from § 17(a)(2), could be enforced without
reference to "whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). See note 209 and accompanying text infra.
79. Professor Loss stated in his treatise that "[t]here is nothing on the face of Clause
(2) itself which smacks of scienter or intent to defraud." 3 Loss, supra note 24, at 1442
(footnote omitted).

securities already issued. It seeks to protect investors by affording a basis
for regulating not only transactions in securities markets, but also marketmakers and others professionally engaged in securities transactions as
well as by imposing regular reporting requirements on various persons
who might impact those markets, including companies registered under
the '34 Act.
Like the '33 Act, the '34 Act expressly provides for private remedies, 80 administrative proceedings and orders, 8' criminal penalties, 82 and
injunction proceedings initiated by the SEC. 83 Various provisions of the
'34 Act have also been construed to imply private rights of action. 84 As in
the discussion of the '33 Act, only express and implied civil remedies
provided by the '34 Act will be considered.
1.

Express Civil Remedies.-Sections 9,85 16(b), 86 18(a),

87

and

20(a) 88

of the '34 Act expressly provide for civil liability. These sections
vary in their approach to civil liability. Thus, plaintiffs suing under
section 989 must prove a market manipulator's willfulness in participating
in proscribed practices that manipulate the pricing mechanism while
liability may be imposed under sections 16(b), for insiders' short-swing
profits,' and 18(a), for material misstatements in filings under the '34
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78n(a), 78p(b), 78t(a) (1970).
81. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). Section 32(a), like § 24 of the '33 Act subjects an
individual to criminal penalties if he willfully violates the provisions of the '34 Act. See note
56 supra. There is a difference, however, between the two statutes. Section 32(a) mandates
criminal penalties for violations of only those rules "the violation of which is made unlawful
or the observance of which is required under" the statute (emphasis added). 15 U.S.C.
78ff(a) (1970). Section 24 of the '33 Act merely speaks to a violation of "the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority of" the '33 Act. 15 U.S.C. §
77x (1970).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970). For a discussion of the statutory bases for enforcement
proceedings under the '34 Act, see notes 243-45 and accompanying text infra.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970), construed in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), construed in
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1013 (1971); 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), construed in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,430
(1964); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970) construed in Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio
1974); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970), construedin Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
86. Id. § 78p(b).
87. Id. § 78r(a).
88. Id. § 78t(a).
89. Id. § 78i. Section 9(a) prohibits five types of activity by a member of a national
securities exchange or others collaberating with him that can be described as actually or
potentially manipulative of the market's pricing mechanism for listed securities. Section 9(e)
provides that any person who
willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of [Section 9] shall be liable to any person who [purchases or sells] any security
at a price . . . affected by such act or transaction, and the person so injured may
sue in law or in equity. . . to recover the damages sustained as a result [thereof].
Id. (emphasis added).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) of the '34 Act established a specialized
form of accounting that can be invoked by or on behalf of an issuer of securities registered
under the Act against its officers, directors, and certain beneficial owners of its securities

Act, 9 1 without proof of defendants' state of mind. Section 20(a), which
deals with controlling persons, adopts the coloration of the underlying
92
section, which provides for the liability of a controlled person.
2. Implied Civil Remedies.-Of those sections of the '34 Act that
have been held to imply a private cause of action, 93 sections 14(a)94 and
15(c)(1) 95 would seem particularly relevant to a discussion of the standard
of culpability required by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Unfortunately,
for present purposes, there is a paucity of private litigation under section
15(c)(1).
The purpose of section 14(a) is to ensure that holders of shares in
registered companies will be provided with certain minimal but reliable
data when their proxies are solicited incident to a forthcoming shareholders' meeting. In implementing section 14(a), SEC has promulgated varifor profit derived from short-swing trading in any of the issuer's equity securities. Such
liability is imposed without proof of either actual misuse of position or disadvantage to the
issuer, other shareholders, or the investing public. In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has allowed an affirmative defense to the effect that defendant insider was in no
position to misuse his status. Under such circumstances the taking of a profit is not deemed
offensive to the philosophy underlying section 16(b). See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973). Existence of such a defense is not implied by
the section itself but is a permissive inference drawn by the Supreme Court.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970). Section 18(a) provides an express private remedy
against
any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement .
in any...
document filed pursuant to [the '34 Act] which statement. . . at the time and in
light of the circumstances under which . . . made [was] false or misleading with
respect to any material fact ....
The statute runs in favor of persons who "in reliance upon such statement [bought or sold]
at a price affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance ....
Individual defendants are given leave to avoid liability by proving that they acted in good
faith and lacked knowledge that the statement in question was false and misleading.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). Section 20(a) imposes liability on a controlling person
"under any provision" of the '34 Act or the regulations issued thereunder, "unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action." Id. (emphasis added). It is evident that this
provision is somewhat broader than the analogous provision in the '33 Act. See note 62
supra.
93. See note 84 supra.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as § 14(a)]. Section 14(a) states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit
any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as § 15(c)(1)].
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as rule 14a-9] provides as
follows:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for
the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.

ous rules. Among these is rule 14a-9, 9 6 an antifraud rule similar to Rule
lOb-5. Many cases that addressed lOb-5 issues have been considered
highly persuasive when similar issues have arisen under rule 14a-9; the
97
reverse is also true.
Under rule 14a-9, defendant's state of mind is not an element
necessary to plaintiff's case, 98 unless, of course, that which is misrepresented is a state of mind. Rather, plaintiff need prove only a material
defect in the proxy solicitation, reliance on the proxy material as a whole,
and a causal relationship between the corporate action taken and the

proxy statement. 99 That the effect of a corporate resolution for which
proxies were so solicited is or would be fair to the objecting shareholders
or shareholders generally is not a defense to plaintiff's case on the issue of
liability, 100 although it may run to damages or other relief.

The statutory purpose of section 14(a) would be entirely frustrated if
either SEC or private suitors were burdened with proving in every case
that defendants' misrepresentations were made with intent to defraud.
Except for an explicit temporal limitation in rule 14a-9, rules lOb-5(2) and
14a-9 proscribe the same generic type of activity, although the latter
focuses on proxy solicitation rather than securities transactions in general.
Since the two rules are, in essence, related, it appears that the broad
purpose of section 10(b)-promotion of fair dealing in connection with
securities transactions by prohibiting use of deceptive or manipulative
devices (save those authorized by SEC as serving a public purpose)101should not be thwarted by demand for proof of respondent's intent or
even a less stringent "scienter" as a condition to the issuance of an order
barring use of a technique found to be actually or potentially deceptive.
Section 15(c)(1) of the '34 Act prohibits brokers' and dealers' use of
"any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance" 102 in over-the-counter markets. SEC is directed to define such
97. For example, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976),
decided shortly after Ernst & Ernst, the issue was whether certain omissions were materially misleading to shareholders. During the course of the TSC decision and citing Ernst &
Ernst, the Court avoided comment on what showing of culpability is required to establish
liability for damages under § 14(a). Id. at 444-45 n.7.
98. Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858-65 (D. Del.
1972); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d
1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
100. Id. at 381-83. Essential fairness of the transaction may mitigate defendant's
damages or otherwise shape the remedy.
101. See note 117 infra.
102. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(c)(1) (West Supp. 1977). Section 15(c)(1) provides in pertinent
part,
No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means of instrumentality
of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to
induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial paper,
bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national securities
exchange of which it is a member by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or
other fraudulent device or contrivance. . . .The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent. (emphasis added)

devices and contrivances and has done so. 103 For the most part, rules
promulgated under section 15(c)(1) set operating norms.
Rule 15cl-2,'14 in the words of its caption, addresses "Fraud and
Misrepresentation" and, at first encounter, may seem remarkably similar
to section 17(a) of the '33 Act 10 5 and Rule I0b-5.1°6 Although 15cl-2(a)
is almost identical to subparts (3) of section 17 and Rule lOb-5, rule
15cl-2, however, lacks an explicit counterpart to subparts (1) and (2) of
section 17 and Rule lOb-5. Rather, rule 15cl-2(b) addresses untrue
statements or misleading omissions made "with knowledge or reasonable
10 7
grounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading."
While sections 15(c)(1) and 10(b) contain similar language,' 08 only
the former links "fraudulent" with "manipulative" and "deceptive."
Seemingly, SEC formulation of rule 15cl-2(b) responded to the fraud
characterization used in the parent section by adopting a restrictive
scienter approach to material misrepresentations and omissions that was
deemed, at a different time and under a different congressional mandate,
unnecessary to lOb-5. But, rule 15cl-2(b) permits the prosecutorial case
to proceed on the basis of knowledge imputed to defendant. 109 This sheds
at least some pall of doubt on the Court's conclusion in Ernst & Ernst that
nothing in the administrative history of section 10(b) indicates that it was
understood to apply to activities other than those that entail intent to
defraud. '1 0 Regrettably, for purposes of illuminating lOb-5 by reference
to rule 15cl-2(b), SEC enforcement is generally by way of disciplinary
proceedings in which, somewhat anomalously, willfulness is an element. 1 ' It seems clear, however, that despite the language of section
15(c)(1), intent to defraud is not part of plaintiff's case, " 2 although, most
assuredly, future 15(c)(1) defendants will invoke Ernst & Ernst in an
103. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c1-1 to 15c]-9 (1977).
104. Id. § 240.15cl-2 provides in pertinent part,
(a) The term 'manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance, as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act [citation omitted] is hereby defined to
include any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
(b) The term 'manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,' as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act, is hereby defined to include any
untrue statement of a material fact and any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, which statement or omission is made
with knowledge or reasonablegrounds to believe that it is untrue or misleading.
(emphasis added)
105. See note 67 supra.
106. See note 1 supra.
107. See note 104 supra.
108. See notes I and 102 supra.
109. See note 104 supra.
110. 425 U.S. at 212-14. Because negligence was not held to be a permissible basis of
liability under Rule lOb-5 until 1961, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), although
rule 15cl-2 was drafted in 1948, the Court's conclusion is even more doubtful.
III. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5)(A)-78o(b)(5)(F) (1970).
112. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); Norris v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 231
(D.C. Cir. 1949).

effort to secure dismissal at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, if not
sooner.
C.

Summary

Review of pertinent portions of the '33 and '34 Acts makes it evident
that Congress established particular standards of fault for the express civil
liability sections. 113 This is relevant, however, only to the limited degree
mandated by the Ernst & Ernst majority opinion's allusion to these
standards." 4 By definition, section 10(b) does not explicitly afford a
private remedy. Therefore, reference to other provisions that have been
held to imply civil liability is appropriate.
Similarity in language of section 17(a) of the '33 Act and, under the
'34 Act, Rules lOb-5 and 15cl-2, has been noted as has similarity in
concept of Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9. Of these, only section 17(a)(1), Rule
lOb-5(1), and rule 15cl-2(b) seem to require at least some form of
scienter. The language of section 15(c)(1) of the '34 Act seems to
mandate this result for rule 15cl-2(b). Because of its reliance on constructive knowledge, however, 15cl-2(b) admits of the negligent abuse of
115
position.
Surely, if federal courts can infer existence of a private cause of
action, they can also infer its elements and assign burdens of proof to the
degree that they do not change the substance of the provision that is said
to imply the cause of action. Just as the rulemaking power accorded
various administrative agencies is not the power to make or expand
law, 1 6 the power of courts to recognize what is implied in a statute
declaring certain practices "unlawful" is not power to contract that
statute, save as required by constitutional principles. Admittedly, section
17(a) of the '33 Act is a statute while Rules lOb-5 and 15cl-2 are limited
by their parent statute.
Whatever is deceptive is a tool of fraud. Since deception alone
neither establishes fraud nor exhausts the concept, what is effectively
deceptive may be quite unrelated to intentional fraud. Therefore, should
not section 10(b) be read as inviting SEC to define those situations in
which use of devices, deceptive in effect, tends to promote fraud or has
consequences that are potentially as untoward as if produced by fraud?
Similarly, should not sections 14(a) and 15(c)(1) and (2) continue to be
read as proscribing acts and practices that are "only" deceptive or
manipulative in their effect upon the protected class, investors? Cannot
the separate subparts of Rule 1Ob-5 be read individually and cannot each
be read as entirely consistent with section 10(b)? Cannot the two sub113.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976).

114.
115.
116.

Id. at 207-11.
See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976).

parts of rule 15cl-2 be contrasted separately against their enabling act?
Various other SEC rules that either proscribe or sanction activities that
are as manipulative in effect or susceptible of deceptive use 1 7 seem to
permit such a reading and evince just such an institutional understanding.
IV.
A.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
Intrinsic Meaning of Section 10(b)

It is useful to recall that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was
the agency initially responsible for administering the '33 Act and continued to be responsible until SEC came into being. 1 8 When that which
became the '34 Act was being designed, the Trade Commission's basic
orientation was to police unfair "methods of competition," which its
enabling act declared unlawful."' Not until passage of the Wheeler-Lea
Act of 1938 were the words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" added
20
to the Trade Commission's charter.'
Under the original language of section 5(a) it was held that "unfair
methods of competition" embraced not only offenses known at common
law such as passing off goods as those of competitors, 121 but also
practices deemed contrary to public policy because they were "characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression that lessen competition by diverting business to the practitioners.' 1 22 A purpose of the
Wheeler-Lea amendments was to change the focus of the FTCA somewhat and protect consumers from unfair practices without reference to
impact on the practitioner's competitors. 123 In any event, when the '34
Act was being considered, the Trade Commission was administering not
only the '33 Act but also the FTCA under which methods unfair in effect
were proscribed without regard to a violator's state of mind or appreciation of unfair effect.
With that background, consider testimony of then Trade Commissioner Landis concerning section 9(c) of House Report 7582124 (a prede117. See, e.g., Rules lOb-2, lOb-4, l0b-6, lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-2, -4, -6, -13
(1977). Rule 1Ob-2 prohibits what can be described as special incentives in connection with a
distribution, but it permits such payments in defined circumstances. Rule lOb-4 prohibits
short tendering in context of a tender offer. Rule lOb-6 permits a form of manipulation
designed to stabilize the market for a security in distribution. Rule 10b-13 prohibits a tender
offeror from making side deals as to the security in question during pendency of the tender
offer.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(5) & 78d (1970).
119. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
120. Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, ch. 49, § 3. 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
121. Juvenile Shoe Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 705 (1923).
122. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
123. Pep Boys v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
Prior to passage of the Wheeler-Lea amendments, the Supreme Court held that false
advertising of an obesity cure was not violative of § 5(a) of the FTCA absent a showing of
injury to the merchandiser's competitors. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
124. 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also S.R. REP. No. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934). Section 9(c) stated,

cessor of section 10(b) of the '34 Act). He stated that section 9(c) gives
"general power to the Commission to prescribe the rules and regulations
governing any other manipulative devices."' 12 5 Presumably, the word
"manipulative" was not then seen as so charged with fraudulent overtones as to warrant prohibition rather than "governing" or channeling.
And, of course, certain patently manipulative practices have been and are
126
tolerated so long as they are practiced within channels defined by SEC.
The next witness to testify concerning section 9(c) was Thomas G.
Corcoran, who voiced the "Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices" epigram descriptive of what became section 10(b), as well as
the observation that it was "a catchall clause to prevent manipulative
devices.' '127 Seemingly, his primary concern was the nature of a device
rather than the user's state of mind. Indeed, one of the problems that was
allegedly rife in the market of those days was unfair advantage routinely
taken by insiders and other sophisticates with little fear of victims achieving redress through traditional legal remedies.
Ultimately, section 10(b) was explained only cursorily by a Senate
Banking Committee report in which it was said that it "authorizes the
Commission . . . to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interest of the
investor."1 28 Thus, regulation was seen as an alternative to prohibition,
suggesting that the Senate committee did not consider all manipulative
and deceptive practices evil per se 129 in contrast with deception with
intent to defraud. Furthermore, practices detrimental to investors were the
focus of such regulation. Such detriment could hardly be detected by
concentrating on the perpetrator's mental state.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .
(c) to use or
employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange any device or contrivance which, or any device or
contrivance in a way or manner which the Commission may by its rules and
regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of
investors.
6 J.S. ELLENBERGER & E.P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 6427 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ELLENBERGER &
MAHAR].

A later version of § 9(c) expanded coverage to all securities, but changed operational focus to "any manipulative device or contrivance" found by the Commission to be
detrimental to the public interest or investor protection. H.R. REP. Nos. 8720 & 3420, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
It is interesting to note that in each version of the bill the essence of present § 9 of
the '34 Act (addressing manipulation on or in connection with the exchanges) immediately
preceded what eventually became present § 10.
125. Hearings on Stock Exchange RegulationBefore the House Committee on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
126. See, e.g., note 117 supra.
127. Hearings, supra note 125, at 115 (emphasis added); 8 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR,
supra note 124, at 115 (1973).
128. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934). ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra
note 124, at 18 (1973).
129. The legislative history seems otherwise unrewarding if, indeed, availability of the
foregoing cryptic references is deemed rewarding.

If, as has been suggested,1 30 it is permissible to construe section
10(b) by reference to what Congress did not say, is it not even more
permissible to consider the familiarity of then Trade Commissioner Landis with the authority and relatively vague standard of delegation afforded
FTC under its basic enabling act and, more particularly, to consider his
comment about proposed section 9(c) in that light? Why should it be
more necessary to divine the intent of the user of a deceptive device in
connection with a securities transaction than it is to divine the intent of a
practitioner of unfair methods of competition under FTCA? Surely, Mr.
Corcoran's testimony is consistent with a concentration upon use of
practices that prove to be deceptive in effect albeit, arguably, the user is
unconscious of such effect. Indeed, considerations of fair play seem
better served by section 10(b), which requires the implementation of
rules, than FTCA section 5(a), which according to the Supreme Court lets
the Trade Commission develop individualized formulations of what is
"unfair" on a case-by-case prosecutorial basis. 131 There surely is nothing
to indicate that the standard of delegation implicit in section 10(b) of the
'34 Act is less definite than that used in FTCA section 5(a), and it would
seem that constitutional norms are at least as well served by requiring
SEC to implement section 10(b) of its enabling act by rule-makingas by
32
permitting FTC to delineate section 5(a) by ad hoc prosecution.'
On its face, section .10(b)'s categorization of unlawful practices
includes only those devices or contrivances that are manipulative, deceptive, or contravene SEC rules.1 33 Implicit in the contravention idea are
several subconcepts: the SEC may, in effect, tolerate certain manipulative or deceptive uses that do not violate other provisions of the federal
securities regulation scheme;13 4 it may prohibit such uses which, although they do not run afoul of other securities regulations, are deceptive
or manipulative;1 35 or it may condition either such toleration or prohibition. 1 36 In effect, SEC has done all three. Even the majority decision in
Ernst & Ernst recognized the proper existence of rules that permit
manipulation of an otherwise free securities market. 137 Surely, just as the
ultimate truth of a statement cannot turn on the speaker's intention and
just as potential to mislead must be determined from the perspective of
the user rather than the disseminator, a device or contrivance can be
characterized as manipulative or deceptive only by reference to the
structure in which it is, was, or will be operative. Intent of the actor is not
130. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
131. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
132. FTC is now explicitly empowered to promulgate rules that amplify section 5(a),
but it need not do so. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1977).
133. See note 117 supra.
134. See, e.g., Rule IOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-13 (1977).
135. See, e.g., Rule l0b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977).
136. See note 117 supra.
137. 425 U.S. at 205 (1976).

determinative of whether the use in question is in fact deceptive or
manipulative. Despite thought to the contrary, while intent to defraud
may assist in such determinations, it is not exhaustive-in the colloquial,
in logic, or at law--of deception or manipulation, and neither is Congress' ability to legislate against use of manipulative or deceptive devices
limited to uses undertaken for the purpose of effecting fraud. Reading
section 10(b) to address only those uses undertaken with fraudulent intent
departs from the section's very clear meaning without constitutional
warrant.
B.

Intrinsic Meaning of Rule JOb-5 and Section 17(a) of the '33 Act

Rule lOb-5 came into being as a rushed reaction to a variety of
scalping.1 38 It undoubtedly is true, as Justice Powell has noted, 39 that an
SEC release announcing adoption of the rule described it as "prohibiting
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities
... IIThe release also stated that Rule lOb-5 would close a loophole
"by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they
engage in fraud in their purchase," since, previously, the "rules against
'4
fraud in the purchase . . .applied only to brokers and dealers." 0 If

analysis of this release is a proper starting point, we might infer from such
language that Rule 1Ob-5 was to regulate only buyers' conduct, since the
release stressed a purpose of "prohibiting fraud in . . .purchase[s]."

But we are taught to examine statutes and regulations themselves to
determine their meaning and to look to authoritative underpinnings only to
resolve ambiguities. To be sure, it is quite common in various administrative areas to look to agency releases for guidance, including amplification
of purposes. This is very true in SEC matters. A fair reading of neither
Rule lOb-5 nor its parent statute, however, discloses wording that limits
their application to buyers' activities, calls for consideration of buyers'
fraudulent state of mind in the purchase of securities, or even uses
ambiguous language in reference to these concepts.
It is a truism that, whatever Rule lOb-5 says, it cannot extend
beyond the section under which it was promulgated. 141 It is equally true
that its closest analogue, section 17(a) of the '33 Act, can be assessed
directly against the Constitution, whereas a two-step analysis is necessary
to determine the validity of application of 1Ob-5. One of the first questions to arise in connection with the Rule is constitutional adequacy of
congressional delegation of power to SEC to promulgate rules "necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 14 2
138. Id. at 212-13 n.32. For a fuller and more entertaining account, see the remarks of
Milton Freeman reported in Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. LAW. 793 (1967).
139. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 n.32.
140. Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) (emphasis added).
141. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See note I supra.

This question is common to all sections of the '33 Act and the '34 Act that
use variations of the 10(b) formula, 143 and, prior to the Ernst & Ernst
decision, the standard had been held constitutionally adequate. 144
Another question is conformance of lOb-5 to the statutory words
"use . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." Accepting arguendo that both adjectives, as known to the marketplace of
1934, were charged with antisocial meaning,145 what then of section
10(b)? Would it apply only to use of devices or contrivances that are
inherently deceptive or otherwise antisocial? If this were so, use of a
neutral device or contrivance as part of a scheme to defraud would not be
covered. The same conclusion would be compelled under Rule lOb-5 to
the extent it embraces use of contrivances and devices other than those
considered inherently deceptive or antisocial. Happily, the courts have
not reached such a conclusion. Oddly enough, in terms of reservations as
to Rule lOb-5(2) expressed by various commentators, 146 concentration on
misrepresentation of material fact seems to conform to even the most
narrowly construed standard of an inherently deceptive device.
On its face, Rule lOb-5 reaches the same species of conduct addressed by section 17(a) of the '33 Act. Of course, their potential
applications differ in that 17(a) looks only to seller's conduct. Rule lOb5(1) involves scienter as it looks to uses with a purpose to defraud. This
would seem to conform with section 10(b) whether or not one thinks that
the parent section characterizes devices as deceptive or manipulative
solely by reference to the user's intent. Rule lOb-5(2) is unlike section
17(a)(2) only in that it does not focus on the actor's success in obtaining
money or property through material misrepresentation. Rule 1Ob-5(3) and
section 17(a)(3) are almost identical.
Focusing on lOb-5(2), can it be said that use of material misrepresentation in a securities transaction is not deceptive because the perpetrator lacked a provable intention to defraud? Does the effect of a material
misrepresentation on an individual vary according to the perpetrator's
intent? Can less be said of Rule lOb-5(3), which addresses business
practices that operate "or would operate as a fraud or deceit," particularly in view of a long history of decisions under FTCA section 5(a)?
While Ernst & Ernst may foreclose this line of reasoning in damage
actions laid under l0b-5, neither the congressional nor any public purpose
would be served by requiring parties seeking equitable relief under 1Ob-5
to carry any burden of showing that the user of deceptive devices acted
with intent to defraud. To do so would be to reward users of cunning
devices who are cunning enough to appear only negligent.
143.
144.
145.
146.

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78o(c)(1) (1970).
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 832 (D. Del. 1951).
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
See, e.g., 3 Loss, supra note 24, at 1442 n.45.

Having completed this brief background analysis of both sections
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it is appropriate to examine the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ernst & Ernst.
C. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
1. Facts.-The late Leston B. Nay, then president of First Securities Company of Chicago (First Securities) defrauded plaintiffs in a Ponzi
scheme.
First Securities was a brokerage firm that enjoyed memberships in
the National Association of Securities Dealers and the Midwest Stock
Exchange (the Exchange). For many years Nay enticed plaintiffs to invest
in his supposedly high-yielding and personally-administered "escrow"
accounts. Plaintiffs' payments were made to Nay or to a depository for
his account. The escrow accounts were not on the books of First
Securities, and the payments were converted to his own use by Nay as
they were received from plaintiffs. The scheme persisted from 1942
through 1966. During its entire life, Nay understandably maintained an
office rule to the effect that only he could open mail either addressed to
him or marked to his attention at First Securities. Incident to his suicide in
1968, Nay left a note admitting that the escrow accounts were
spurious. 147
Messrs. Ernst & Ernst were retained as First Securities' independent
auditors from 1946 to 1967. They also prepared SEC reports required of
First Securities by the '34 Act and the Exchange. Plaintiffs sued the
auditors on the theory that they aided and abetted Nay's violations of Rule
1Ob-5 by failing to properly audit First Securities. 14 Underlying the suit
was a theory that an audit should have uncovered Nay's mail rule, which
would have put the auditors on notice to inquire into Nay's activities and
necessitated comment to SEC and the Exchange concerning the irregular
149
procedure.
Note that the auditors were charged with aiding a fraud perpetrated
neither by their client, First Securities, to which their primary duty
undoubtedly ran, nor in connection with First Securities' accounts.
Rather, defendant stood at a distance from the actual perpetrator of fraud,
who owed independent duties of loyalty to First Securities and to his
escrow account customers. Through discovery it was developed that
147. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 189 (1976). After the suicide SEC
commenced proceedings to place First Securities in receivership, in which validity of claims
by various victims of the fraudulent escrow accounts were allowed on the theory that First
Securities had aided and abetted Nay's violation of § 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule
lOb-5. SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972).
148. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976). Until summary judgment
in its favor was sustained, the Exchange was a codefendant. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
149. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976).

plaintiffs were content to rely on the auditors' supposed "inexcusable
50
negligence" in their auditing procedures.'
2. Lower Court Decisions.-The district court rejected the auditors' contention that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do not afford a
remedy in damages for negligently abetting a securities fraud. Summary
judgment was granted, however, on the ground that there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the audits had been conducted in
151
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Reversing and remanding, 152 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
relied largely on a related decision concerning the Exchange' 5 3 in which it
held that a cause of action for abetting a violation of Rule lOb-5 through
inaction could be maintained by showing
that the party charged.

.

. [knew] or, but for breach of duty of

inquiry, should have [known] of the fraud, and that possessing
such knowledge the party failed to act due to an improper
motive or breach of a duty of disclosure.' 54
Chief Judge Swygert amplified this position in the Ernst & Ernst decision.
[W]here, as here, it is urged that the defendant through action
as well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another, a claim
for aiding and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that the
defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the
duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of
inquiry the defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and (5)
there is a causal connection between the breach of duty of
inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation of the underlying
fraud; that is, adequate inquiry and subsequent disclosure
would have led to the discovery of the underlying fraud or its
prevention. 155
Stating that defendant auditors had both common law and statutory duties
of inquiry into the adequacy of First Securities' internal controls, Judge
Swygert recognized that the common law duty was owed only to those in
privity with or otherwise foreseen by the auditors.' 56 The court, however,57
moved rather too quickly from recognition of a statutory duty,
"grounded on a concern for the protection of investors" to casting
150. Id. at 190 n.5. Plaintiffs also conceded nonreliance on the financial statements and
reports prepared by defendants, on their certificates of the audit's scope, and on professional opinion.
151. Id. at 191. The district court also held the action barred by both equitable estoppel
and the Illinois statute of limitations. Id. at 191 n.6. The opinion of the district court is
unreported.
152. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
153. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).
154. 503 F.2d at 374.
155. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974).
156. Id. at 1105.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976). This rule sets out the various reports and financial
statements that a broker or dealer must file with the SEC.

plaintiffs as actual beneficiaries of the duty of inquiry. 158 The opinion
betrays no recognition of a principle that forseeability, which governs to
whom relevant common law duties are owed, should be equally applicable in determining to whom a comparable duty under the securities laws is
owed when the regulatory expression in question generalizes as to the
class protected.
Having so easily identified a duty supposedly owed to plaintiffs, it
was simple for the court to conclude that the "fundamental issue" of the
case was whether "the uncontroverted evidence revealed that Ernst &
Ernst conducted its audits with all due care and in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards," 159 a fact question that would
preclude summary judgment. Since various guides published by SEC and
the American Institue of Certified Public Accountants indicated that
"inadequacy in internal control is of signal importance only when it
enters the realm of materiality,"' 6 ° Nay's mail rule was held to present
the basis of a finding of materiality which, if affirmatively decided,
would set the stage for a further finding as to whether the auditors failed
to exercise the due care required of a professional auditor in that it did not
discover "a material inadequacy in internal accounting controls."' 61 These
considerations, of course, would lead to findings as to breach of the duty
of disclosure and, ultimately, causation.
3. Supreme Court Opinion.-All aiding and abetting issues were
set aside by the Supreme Court. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell
stated and answered the question as follows:
We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a
private cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud. [citation omitted]
We con62
clude that it will not and therefore we reverse.
As indicated earlier, 163 scienter was further defined by the statement, "In
this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud," '6 but this was qualified somewhat
158.

503 F.2d at 1105.

159. Id.at 1108.
160.
161.

Id. at II11.
Id. at 1115.

162. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
163. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
164. 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.12 (emphasis added). Significance, if any of the phrase "in
this opinion" is hard to fathom. The Court may have felt it necessary to suggest that the
formulation was only the law of the case and to leave the door open for argument about
misfeasance versus nonfeasance. Plaintiff alleged that the auditors had negligently aided
and abetted deliberate fraud by another servant of their client and had done so by not
checking for a "mail rule." Some will be tempted to say that the Court, albeit inartful, is
teaching that there is no aiding and abetting liability absent deliberate involvement with the
primary perpetrator. But the very explicit statement of the issue and conclusion resist such
characterization as does a specific reservation whether "civil liability for aiding and abetting
is appropriate under [§ 10(b) and Rule l0b-5]." Id.at 191-92 n.7. Note that the Second

by reserving decision on whether "reckless behavior" would suffice "for
65
civil liability" under section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.1
Reasons supporting the decision can be divided into four segments.
The first dealing with the language of section 10(b) is seemingly dispositive. The others treat the section's legislative history, the interface between implied liability under section 10(b) and other provisions of the
securities acts, and the administrative history of Rule lOb-5. Without
intending to endorse any part of the majority opinion, the authors submit
that the confusion engendered by the Ernst & Ernst decision flows from
the last three segments of the opinion.
By way of introduction to these four areas, Justice Powell quoted the
following statement from his own concurring opinion in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: 6 6 "The starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 167 Amusingly,
explication of the point follows immediately upon a very pointed recall of
the fact that section 10(b) does not "by its terms create an express civil
68
remedy. '1
Unfortunately, in the first and truly dispositive segment of the
opinion, Justice Powell was content to set up a series of strawmen and
knock them down. He first opined that the expressions " 'manipulative'
or 'deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly
suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct."' 6 9 He then noted a brief filed by SEC as amicus curiae in
which it was asserted that the adjectives "deceptive" and "manipulative" do not limit operation of section 10(b) to knowing or intentional
practices.' 7 ° Justice Powell summarized SEC's reasoning as follows:
"[S]ince the 'effect' upon investors . . . is the same regardless of
whether the conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have
intended to bar all such practices and not just those done knowingly or
intentionally."' 7' In a most questionable reductio, he then wrote that the
"logic of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly
faultless conduct ....
"172 Thus, seemingly, breach of duty is "wholy
faultless" if accomplished through neglect.
Ignoring any possibility that the 1934 Congress, focusing on
minimization of the role played by deceptive and manipulative devices in
the market place for securities, chose to relieve prosecutors of proving the
Circuit presumes that the aiding and abetting violation of lOb-5 is still a viable ground for
liability in damages. Hirsh v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
165. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
166. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
167. Id. at 756.
168. 425 U.S. at 196-97.
169. Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 197-98.
171. Id. at 198.
172. Id.

motive entertained by those who use such devices to the prejudice of
innocents (just as earlier and later Congresses opted to do with FTCA
section 5(a) in the connection with a broader market place), 17 3 Justice
Powell then charged SEC with ignoring the import of "the words
'manipulative,' 'device,' and 'contrivance,' terms that make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different
from negligence."' 74 This, of course, elides the fact that section 10(b)
addresses "use" not "intentional use" of certain devices that are themselves characterized as deceptive or manipulative. Support for the Court's
conclusion concerning the type of conduct proscribed by section 10(b) was
sought in a series of optional definitions from a popular dictionary dated
1934, which, regrettably, are as capable of forming a neutral or even
benign impression as a malign one.' 75 This excursion concludes, by way
of afterthought, that SEC "also ignores . . . the terms '[t]o use or
employ;' language that is supportive of the view that Congress did not
intend § 10(b) to embrace negligent conduct.' '1 76 Justice Powell's
rationale, in effect, tortures section 10(b) into authorizing SEC to prohibit
or to permit a deceitful use of a manipulative device, which, at least to
the authors, is inconceivable. Apparently, Justice Powell did not conceive that, absent an adverb or adverbs of characterization, "to use or
employ" is essentially neutral and leads to consideration of just what one
is forbidden "to use or employ."
Closing the first section of the opinion is a response to the lOb-5
plaintiff's usual argument concerning need to flexibly construe remedial
legislation by reference to its purposes. Noting that "Congress did not
adopt uniformly a negligence standard even as to express civil remedies," Justice Powell purported to contrast liability of persons such as
"experts" under section 11 of the '33 Act (an example of ". . . liability
predicated upon a failure to exercise reasonable care") with situations in
which "good faith is an absolute defense" under section 18 of the '34 Act
and in which issuers are held liable without fault under section 11 of the
'33 Act. 177 This, of course, fails to recognize that those "experts" and
others can be held liable for damages under section 1 (a) of the '33 Act
without proof of fault, whether their conduct is intentional or negligent, 178 and that diligence becomes an issue only as an affirmative
defense. 179 "Good faith" plays a similar role under section 18(a) of the
'34 Act. ' 8 0 The true difference is that, assuming presence of a material
defect in the registration statement of the type addressed by8 section 11 (a),
issuers are denied the due diligence affirmative defense.' '
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra.
425 U.S. at 199.
Id.at 199 nn.20 &21.
Id. at 199 n.20.
Id. at 200.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77k(b) (1970).
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From this, Justice Powell returned to the theme that
"[a]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of
liability created by a particular section

.

. .must

.

.

.

rest primarily on

182

This clears the way for a quantum leap,
the language of that section."
by way of transition to the second segment of the opinion, that, in context
of a "judicially implied liability," 183 section 10(b) "so clearly connotes
1 84
intentional misconduct, . . . further inquiry may be unnecessary."
The second segment of the opinion addresses legislative history or,
rather, its paucity. It traces evolution of section 10(b) from a bill which
would have given SEC a blank check to stigmatize use of "any device or
contrivance

.

.

, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner,"

which is defined as "detrimental to the public interest or to the proper
!85
protection of investors.''
Although recognized to be "bereft" of any explanation of the
operation of section 10(b), 8 6 the history was found sufficient to warrant a
conclusion that the section addressed practices "that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent
conduct alone." 87 Principal predicates were the Corcoran testimony and
a finding that the history provides "no indication . . that § 10(b) was
intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. " 188 Lesser reliance
182. 425 U.S. at 200. See notes 167-68 and accompanying text supra.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 201.
185. Id.See notes 124-29 and accompanying text supra.
186. Id.at 201.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 202 (emphasis added). This wonderful approach to construing a not very (if
at all)ambiguous statute isreminiscent of the attacks of anti-federalists upon the newly
incivil cases. From the silence
failure to provide for jury trial
proposed constitution's initial
of the proposed constitution on the matter of civil litigation, they inferred (or, at least,
argued) that the Constitution abolished trial by jury in civil causes. To this, Publius
(Hamilton?) replied,
With regard to civil causes, subtleties . . . have been employed to countenance
the surmise that a thing which is only not provided for, is entirely abolished.
Every man of discernment must at once perceive the wide difference between
silence and abolition. But as the inventors of this fallacy have attempted to
support it by certain legal maxims, .... it may not be wholly useless to explore
the ground they have taken.
The maxims on which they rely are . . . 'A specification of particulars is an
exclusion of generals' or, 'The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another'
The rules of legal interrelation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts
in the construction of the laws . . . .Let me ask if it is consistent with commonsense to suppose that a provision obliging the legislative power to commit the trial
of criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to authorize or permit that
mode of trial in other cases? Is it natural to suppose that a command to do one
thing is a prohibition to the doing of another, where there was a previous power to
do, and which is not incompatible with the thing commanded to be done?
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 83 (2d ed. R.P. Fairfield ed. 1966). Query, whether henceforth
statutes will be given a limiting interpretation by referring to what neither they nor their
legislative history denies?
A more recent and, the authors think, benign use of the absence of legislative history to
prove a point appears in Continential T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
Again writing for the majority, Justice Powell cites repeal of the Miller-Tydings and

was placed on a suggestion that, in context of the inadequacy of selfregulation by the exchanges, section 10 "aimed at those manipulative
and deceptive practices . . . demonstrated to fulfill no useful func-

tion, ' " 8 9 and the fact that proposed express civil liability provisions
afforded an affirmative defense sounding in good faith. 19°
The authors' view of the Corcoran testimony, in context of Commissioner Landis' testimony and the role of the Trade Commission at that
time, has already been noted, 91 To them, this testimony does not in any
way appear to oppose prohibiting use of deceptive devices, even though
192
no evidence of malign purpose is offered. As to the double negative,
what can be said about a court that concludes from the legislature's failure
to explain absence of restrictive characterization in a statute that, therefore, such characterization exists? The reference to outlawing those
manipulative devices that serve "no useful function" is more consistent
with the absence of scienter as a statutory requirement than is the supposition that section 10(b) was aimed at only devices used with intent to
defraud. Provision of a good faith defense for those otherwise liable
under an express liability section does not in and of itself preclude
imposition of liability without proof of bad faith.
Comparison of section 10(b) to express liability sections of both the
'33 and '34 Acts was undertaken in the third segment of the majority
opinion. This was occasioned by arguments of amicus curiae and respondents that, when it chose to do so, Congress experienced no difficulty in burdening prosecutors with proof of, for example, willfulness.
Responding to SEC citation of section 9(e) of the '34 Act as one in which
civil liability for particular market manipulations depends upon proof of
willful participation, 19 3 Justice Powell said that when Congress enacted
provisions that created express liability, it also clearly specified whether
recovery was "premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence,
or entirely innocent mistake."' ' 94 He cited sections 11, 12, and 15 of the
'33 Act and 9, 18, and 20 of the '34 Act as examples.
If one ignores section 12(1) of the '33 Act1 95 altogether and equates
those situations in which defendants are permitted to make due diligence
McGuire Acts' exemption from federal antitrust strictures of "fair-trading" pursuant to
state law as an expression of congressional approval of the characterization of price-fixing
as a per se violation of the Sherman Act. He contrasts this with an absence of similar
expressions concerning nonprice restrictions in vertical distribution structures as one of the
(lesser) predicates for dispensing with per se characterization of such restrictions. 97 S. Ct.
at 2558 n. 18. Of course, there was no counterpart to Miller-Tydings that favored nonprice
vertical restraints during the currency of their late lamentable per se characterization.
189. 425 U.S. at 204-06.
190. Id.
191. See notes 124-32 and accompanying text supra.
192. See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970). See notes 85-92 and accompanying text supra.
194. 425 U.S. at 207.
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(l) (1970). See note 62 supra.

defenses to avoid otherwise strict liability' 96 with those in which plaintiff
must prove defendant's fault, the thrust of Justice Powell's synopsis is
correct. Otherwise it is an oversimplification. But can these considera197
tions be ignored? Note section 12(1) of the '33 Act for example.
Neither knowledge nor intent of one who sells unregistered securities is
put in issue. The provision would be pointless if it were.
The majority opinion illustrates its point by again misapplying the
affirmative defenses available under section 11 of the '33 Act, 98 to
rationalize that "express recognition of a cause of action premised on
negligent behavior in § 11 stands in sharp contrast to the language of §
10(b) ...
"199 The opinion states that this contrast undercuts argument
that the uses proscribed by the latter could be negligent.2 °° Would it not
have been easier and fairer to describe section 11 as demanding the
highest standard of care by those responsible for writing registration
statements, a standard mitigated only by proof that even due diligence did
not permit avoiding the material misrepresentation in question? Surely, as
recognized by the Court, 20 1 section 11 constitutes an issuer an insurer
against material misrepresentations, a role in which various of its servants
are also cast, unless they demonstrate freedom from any reasonable
attribution of personal fault. Is this a "cause of action based on negligent
behavior"?
Justice Powell also reflected on the procedural restrictions imposed
on plaintiffs under sections 11, 12(2), and 15 of the '33 Act (all of which
place on defendants the burden of negating knowledge and proving due
diligence). ° Such restrictions include security for defendants' costs,
assessment of costs, and a statute of limitations for which there is no
counterpart expressly applicable to the cause of action implied by section
10(b). 2 °3 Characterizing sections 11, 12(2), and 15 as negligence-based
provisions, the Court concluded that section 10(b) "cannot be extended,
consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent
wrongdoing. "201 Thus, by continuing to ignore the very real difference
between undertaking to prove another's negligence and proving the absence of negligence, Justice Powell was able to continue,
Such extension would allow causes of action covered by §§ 11,
12(2), and 15 to be brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby
nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions. [citations omitted] We
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See notes 59-66 and accompanying text supra.
15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
425 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).
Id.

201.
202.

Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77o (1970).

203.
204.

425 U.S. at 209-10.
Id. at 210.

would be unwilling to bring about this result absent substantial
20 5
support in the legislative history, and there is none.
What Justice Powell failed to grasp is that the postulated "extension" surely would have the described effect only for those plaintiffs
willing to pay the price of proving how defendants caused the defect in
question, 20 6 a burden not imposed on plaintiffs by sections 11, 12, and
15.207 These sections invite litigation in which, assuming a material
misrepresentation, defendants must affirmatively avoid liability. In the
case-in-chief, plaintiffs prove only the deceptive quality of the misrepresentation. These sections are well calculated to exert an in terrorem effect
on potential defendants. Yet, lest the sections invite abuse, potential
liability for costs is intended to cause plaintiffs to pick their defendants
carefully. While plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5 are not so threatened, they
have the heavier proof burden of demonstrating defendants' responsibility
in fact for the defect even if a negligence concept is retained.
Finally, in the last segment of the opinion, 20 8 Justice Powell turned
to an analysis of Rule lOb-5 itself. He acknowledged,
Viewed in isolation the language of subsection (b), and arguably
that of subsection (c), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any type of material misstatement or omission, and any
course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors,
whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not. 209
Justice Powell opined, however, that such a reading would not comport
with the administrative history of the rule, which, he stated, indicates that
Rule lOb-5 should apply only to intentional misconduct. 210 In support of
this conclusion Justice Powell referred to the circumstances that necessitated the hastened drafting of lob-5 and led to SEC Release 3230,
which describes the Rule as "prohibiting fraud." ' 211 Although the contents of the release were certainly accurately described, it would seem
that such releases are not ordinarily limiting on the rules they announce.
Having alluded to this limitation by release, Justice Powell concluded his exposition by declaring,
When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation
and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivancesthe commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we
are quite unwilling
to extend the scope of the statute to negli212
gent conduct.

205. Id. at 210-11 (footnote omitted).
206. This article does not discuss the suggested "implied nullification" theories that
pertain to supposed overlaps between §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 of the '33 Act and § 18 of the '34
Act on the one hand and § 10(b) of the '34 Act on the other. Compare Fischman v. Raytheon
Manufacturing Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. i951) with Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77(2), 77o (1970).
208. 425 U.S. at 212-14.
209. Id. at 212.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 212-13 n.32. See notes 138-40 and accompanying text supra.
212. 425 U.S. at 214.

These words, which add little save a sweeping conclusion, are of obvious
import to not only defendants in damage actions but also petitions in
equity that invoke lOb-5.
D. Commentary
There are any number of interesting facets to the majority opinion in
Ernst & Ernst, most of which have been discussed previously. Nonetheless, Justice Powell's concern that SEC's analysis would lead to liability
for wholly faultless conduct 2 13 warrants further comment.
Such concern evokes memory of the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Park,214 a decision from which Justice Powell dissented.
In Park, a multi-unit supermarket chain and its president were prosecuted
for violating section 301(k) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act 215 by permitting food stored in a warehouse to be accessible to
rodents, which resulted in adulteration.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) personnel inspected storage
facilities maintained by the chain and wrote to the president warning of
the exposure to contamination. A vice president responded with a description of remedial measures. Ultimately, at the instance of FDA, the
chain and its president were charged and arraigned. The chain pleaded
guilty, and the president pleaded not guilty. According to a company
by-law, the president had the duty of "general and active supervision of
''216 It
the affairs, business, offices and employees of the company ....
was not controverted that the president delegated "normal operating
duties," including sanitation, but retained policy control and coordination. He admitted responsibility for "the entire operation of the company," but maintained that sanitation was assigned to "dependable
subordinates.' '217
Having been charged that they need not be concerned with defendant's personal relationship to the adulteration if they were satisfied that he
occupied a position of authority and responsibility in relation to the
adulteration, the jury found defendant guilty. The Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded, since the instruction might have left the jury with an
"erroneous impression that Park could be found guilty in the absence of
'wrongful action' on his part [of which] proof was required by due
process.'"'28 The remand included instructions that such "wrongful acId. at 198.
421 U.S. 658 (1975).
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1970), provides,
following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: . . .
(k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the
whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a
food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for
sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and
results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
216. 421 U.S. at 663 n.7.
217. Id. at 664.
218. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1974).
213.
214.
215.
The

tion" might be "gross negligence and inattention in discharging . . .
corporate duties . . . which would 'cause' [adulteration]. "219
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority of six, Chief
Justice Burger stated that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are . . . demanding, and perhaps
onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a
right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of
authority in business enterprises whose services and products
affect the health and well-being of the public ....
The thought that criminal liability for adulteration is shared by "all
22
persons who aid and abet its commission" is not a new proposition. 1
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibits shipping adulterated foods in
commerce and, after shipment, causing adulteration. 222 Despite language
that parallels section 10(b) of the '34 Act as implemented by Rule lOb5(2), enforcement of the adulteration provisions is not concerned with
whether the defect was caused intentionally.
The Act does not, . . . make criminal liability turn on 'awareness of some wrongdoing' or 'conscious fraud.' The duty imposed by Congress on responsible corporate agents is, we emphasize, one that requires the highest standard of foresight and
vigilance, but the Act, in its criminal aspect, does not require
that which is objectively impossible. The theory upon which
responsible corporate agents are held criminally accountable
for 'causing' violations of the Act permits a claim that a defendant was 'powerless' to prevent or correct the violation to 'be
raised defensively at a trial on the merits.' [citation omitted]
. . . [Thus] the government establishes a prima facie case when
it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier
of the facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in
the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent
the violation complained of, and
• . . or promptly to correct
223
that he failed to do so.
Thus, in a criminal proceeding there is no requirement that the government prove defendant's "wrongful action." 224 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the statute commands that foods shall be free of adulterants. Consequently, the government must prove an adulterating presence
and defendant's generic responsibility for the condition that permitted
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. 421 U.S. at 672.
221. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
222. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1970).
223. 421 U.S. at 672-74 (emphasis added). Although criminal liability for adulteration
of food does not turn on defendant's "awareness of some wrongdoing," note that the
Second Circuit holds that "knowledge of the fraud, and not merely the undisclosed material
facts, is indispensable" to imposing liability in damages for aiding and abetting violation of
Rule lOb-5. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977).
224. See note 218 and accompanying text supra.

adulteration, although he may be several levels removed from actual
control of the scene. The burden then shifts to defendant, who must
demonstrate that he was "powerless" to avoid the adulteration.
Just as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibits, among other
things, shipment of adulterated or misbranded foods, it would seem that
section 10(b) of the '34 Act bans the use of deceptive devices that
contravene SEC rules. Further, it would appear that neither the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act nor section 10(b) necessarily looks to the state of
mind of those who violate these provisions. If the Court does not hesitate
to impose what is essentially absolute criminal liability on one who has a
remote reporting relationship to those who actually cause exposure to
adulteration, it is difficult to conceive why the Court hesitates, in a
similar statutory context, to impose civil liability upon proof of defendant's use of a deceptive device, defendant's immediate duty to avoid such
use, and defendant's objective breach of that duty. Certainly this burden
' 225
of proof would not penalize the "wholly faultless."
Why then is the holding in United States v. Park226 so different from
the general theme of Ernst & Ernst with respect to use of deceptive or
manipulative devices or contrivances that "adulterate" the information
otherwise afforded investors? A hint is provided by a footnote to the
Court's opinion in Ernst & Ernst, which states in pertinent part,
We do note that the standard urged by respondents would
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to
impose liability upon accountants and other experts who perform services or express opinions with respect to matters under
the Acts. Last term, in Blue Chip Stamps [citation omitted], the
Court pertinently observed:
'While much of the development of the law of deceit has
been the elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just
225. That the Court may eventually impose liability in damages under lob-5 for at least
gross neglect is suggested by its refusal, subsequent to announcing its decision in Ernst &
Ernst, to grant certiorari in a criminal case that arose out of a proxy solicitation. In United
States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) an independent accountant had uncritically accepted a report that a substantial contract replaced
another of equivalent dollar amount. The accountant knew that the initial contract had not
been consummated and that this seriously affected the accounting period in question. The
requisite mens rea was inferred because the defendant had "shut his eyes in reckless
disregard of his knowledge that highly suspicious figures, known to him to be suspicious,
were being included in the . . . earnings figures with which he was 'associated' in the proxy
statement." Id. at 320 (emphasis added). Later in 1976, the Court refused certiorari in a case
in which defendant questioned inter alia whether indictment for violation of Rule lOb-5
must charge intent to deceive or defraud. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
While the authors realize that Natelli is a criminal case arising from alleged violation of
the proxy rules and that denial of certiorari lacks substantial significance as precedent, it is
certainly possible to infer some meaning from it in terms of civil liability under Rule lOb-5.
Furthermore, the lower court decision is consistent with a much earlier conviction under
§ 17(a) of the '33 Act. Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940). See also
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 1006 (1970) as to
prosecutions under § 32 of the '34 Act.
226. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).

claims, we are not the first court to express concern that the
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than

good. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, [citation omitted] Chief

Judge Cardozo observed with respect to 'a liability in an inde-

terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class:
"The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences."

[citation omitted]
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the
standard urged by respondents. As investors in transactions
initiated by Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable
227
users of the financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst.

How easy it would have been to pay deserved homage to the entire
Ultramares decision or to decide Ernst & Ernst under the theory of
foreseeability recognized in the quoted footnote, rather than to engage in
the torturous exercise of justifying a holding that negligent breach of the
duty to avoid use of deceptive devices had never been within the scope of
section 10(b). Obviously, the Court intended a different result .228 Furthermore, Judge Cardozo not only recognized the danger of an indeterminate class but also met it in a manner entirely consistent with the policy of
discouraging even negligent breaches of a defined duty to avoid deceptive
usages. 229

In any event, Ernst & Ernst is law and its holding teaches that, in
damage actions pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, plaintiff must
prove defendant's intent to deceive. We are left to speculate as to whether
recklessness in determining truth of the representation or recklessness in
representing a condition as true without intent to verify may be substituted for intentional wrongdoing. 230 Although it is unclear whether the
227. 425 U.S. at 214-15 n.33 (emphasis added).
228. Id. Consider whether or not "the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiffs"
underlies the unnecessary part IV of the majority opinion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. S.
William Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977). The authors wonder, but have not pursued, whether
the Supreme Court's recent imposition of requirements for proof of subjective intent in
areas other than securities regulation (see, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977)) and for what amounts to privity as a
standing requirement in price-fixing cases (Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061
(1977)) are not related to this fear of court congestion. Might this be a motive for the
explanation, in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), of when
issued stock is not a security within (or despite) statutory definitions? In this connection, it
seems fair to recall the famous CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM, ATTACK ON AMERICAN FREE

ENTERPRISE SYSTEM of August 23, 1971 from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Esq. to Eugene B.
Snyder, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which, under
the caption "Neglected Opportunity in the Courts," it was said that "the judiciary may be
the most important instrument for social, economic and political change." U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Doc. No. 2900, page 6. Of course, this is true but one must believe that such
strict constructionists as may happen to be on the Court, now or at any given time, will resist
any suggestion to rewrite substantive law as a compromise to alleviate undoubted problems
such as court congestion.
229. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
230. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.

impact of Judge Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven &
Co. 231 was appreciated, it is possible that its reasoning will be adopted
eventually and "at least" gross neglect viewed as equivalent to the
"mental state" contemplated by Ernst & Ernst. While the ultimate
statement that negligence is an improper basis of liability under section
10(b) would seem to exclude all shades of negligence, it will be easy
enough to reinterpret Ernst & Ernst as reading "simple neglect" or
"mere neglect" out of section 10(b) and as reformulating "scienter" to
include reckless disregard of truth.232 Groundwork for such an interpretation was laid in the Court's recent Santa Fe Industries v. Green deci23 3
sion.
Because Ernst & Ernst dealt only with damage actions brought
pursuant to Rule lOb-5, the question, however, remains as to what degree
of culpability should be required in actions for injunctive relief under the
Rule. In an attempt to answer this question, this article will discuss the
nature of SEC enforcement proceedings, their relationship to private
equity actions, and cases decided both prior and subsequent to Ernst &
Ernst that dealt with the standard of culpability in enforcement actions.
V.

Enforcement Actions

A.

Private Suits for Injunction

A year before its Ernst & Ernst decision, the Supreme Court stated
that the bases for granting injunctive relief to private petitioners in federal
court include irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies, even
though violation of the '34 Act has been established. 23 4 When violations
of federal statutes are in controversy, petitioner must demonstrate that
individual rights will be prejudiced by defendant's conduct. 235 Petitioners
also must show that remedies at law are clearly inadequate 236 and that
irreparable injury will ensue absent restraint .237 Unless petitioner has
unclean hands 238 or inequity would flow from granting the petition
because of changed circumstances,239 such a showing will warrant is231. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
232. See, e.g., Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and lob-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147,
161-64 (1976).
233. 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977). See note 19 supra.
234. Rondeau v. Moisinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); see Beacon Theatres Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
235. Delaware & Hudson Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 450 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
236. Crimmins v. American Stock Exchange, 346 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
237. Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
238. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Independent Stockholders Comm., 354 F. Supp. 895
(D. Del. 1973).
239. See, e.g., Muscianese v. United States Steel Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D. Pa.
1973).

suance of an injunction couched in terms appropriate to a balancing of the
contending interests.2 4°
Under the securities acts, the obvious point of an injunction granted
to a private petitioner is not only to avoid untoward individual prejudice,
but also to acquit public policy implicit in the regulatory scheme. 24 1 In
this context it has long been thought that "[i]t is not necessary for
prophylactic relief to242establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages."
B.

SEC Suits for Injunction

SEC injunction petitions are creatures of statute. 243 Section 21(d) of
the '34 Act provides,
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter, the rules
and regulations thereunder,. . .it may in its discretion bring an
action . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order shall be granted without bond. 2'
Unlike private petitioners, SEC need not prove that available legal remedies are inadequate and that irreparable injury will result if an injunction
is denied. Rather, it must establish that "there is a reasonable expectation
that . . . defendants will thwart the policy of the Act by engaging in
activities proscribed thereby." 245 Note, however, that this does not go to
the substantive question, but to the propriety of issuing an order.
An issue left unresolved by Ernst & Ernst is the degree of fault SEC
must demonstrate before an injunction can issue. 2' Private petitioners
have the same question. Is proof of what some call "mere" neglect of the
public duty to avoid use of deceptive devices sufficient to permit enjoining a current violation of 1Ob-5? On the theory that "both private and
public actions arise under the same Rule, and the legal problems involved
240. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great A&P Tea Co.,
356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
241. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
242. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963). See also
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1963). But note that Genesco
stood for the injunctive relief exception to the "Birnbaum Rule" on standing (see Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)), which is at
least called into question by Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975),
which, like Ernst & Ernst, was a private damage action.
243. '33 Act, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); '34 Act, §§ 21(d), 21(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d),
78(e) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act, § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. §79r (1970); Trust
Indenture Act, § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77uuu (1970); Investment Adviser's Act, § 209(e), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1970).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
245. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959). See also SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975).
246. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.

in the two situations, while not identical, are closely related," 247 principal attention will be accorded to SEC enforcement.
Parenthetically it must be observed that extension of the Ernst &
Ernst version of a scienter requirement to enforcement actions will
complicate SEC's case beyond the liability question. It is a truism that
section 21(d) of the '34 Act does not authorize issuance of injunctions for
past violations. What will occur when SEC attempts to prove, by reference to past conduct, that there is reasonable expectation of continued
or future violation? This, of course, goes to whether an injunction should
issue rather than whether it can issue. 24s Evidence of past uses of
deceptive devices can be adduced only to establish a reasonable likelihood of future violations. 249 Will former use of deceptive devices rooted
in negligence continue to be proper matter for a court's consideration
when it assesses present uses of such devices (whether intentional or
negligent)? Or, if injunctions that acquit Rule lOb-5 can issue only
against intentional uses, will SEC's demonstration of past lapses also be
limited to the provably intentional?
It is much too easy to try to avoid this question by arguing that past
negligence can be used to paint a picture of present willfulness. Suppose
that there is a history of past uses of deceptive devices rooted in neglect,
but that the nature of the devices or the manifestations of neglect, or both,
are inconsistent because of successive and rapid management turn-overs.
Surely a court sitting in equity would be loathe to find a propensity to
intentionally use deceptive devices. Yet, quite conceivably, this is the
next policy dilemma that would confront trial courts if the Ernst & Ernst
scienter requirement were held applicable to 1Ob-5 injunction petitions.
C. Decisions PredatingErnst & Ernst
Prior to issuance of the majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst, most
courts thought that a neglectful breach of the public duty to avoid use of
deceptive devices would support SEC enforcement proceedings. In what
seems to remain the leading case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co. ,250 the
Second Circuit made several contributions to the theory of these proceedings. The primary defendants, officers of Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., were
charged with making a misleading disclosure to the public of material
information and acting on this information in buying and selling the
company's stock before an accurate disclosure of the information could
be effected. The company was joined as defendant.
247. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 471 n.4 (1%9) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
248. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
249. Id.
250. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S.
176 (1969)[hereinafter referred to as TGS].

Addressing the company itself (which, after all, had not profited
from the various ill-advised activities of its officers), Judge Waterman
wrote that an injunction under lOb-5 was proper if release of the now
famously misleading press statement "resulted from a lack of due diligence on the part of TGS. "25" Commenting that it does not seem unfair to
burden corporations to ascertain the truth of statements released to shareholders or the investing public, he noted that Rule lOb-5 was violated
whenever material misstatements are disseminated "irrespective of
whether . . . issuance . . . was motivated by corporate officials for
diligent
ulterior purposes," unless management demonstrates that it25was
2
in ascertaining data, which it then published in good faith.
This approach still seems entirely sensible in context of not only the
language of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, but also internal communications difficulties experienced by complex organizations. The technique of
shifting the burden of proving due diligence was, of course, consistent
with the language of the express liability sections.
Judge Waterman took the same tack, albeit with greater rhetorical
rigor, with certain of the individual defendants other than TGS. Relying
on an earlier Second Circuit decision that described Rule lOb-5 as
contemplating "some form of the traditional scienter requirement,' '253
defendants urged that an honest belief as to adequacy of data available to
the public should insulate them. 2- Since there was nothing in the statute
"to require a showing of specific fraudulent intent," Judge Waterman
saw nothing inconsistent in requiring such defendants to prove that their
honest belief was "reasonable under the circumstances.' 255
Judge Friendly's concurrence was essential to the majority in this
pivotal decision. He wrote a separate opinion, which serves as the first
precedent cited by Justice Powell for the proposition that "§ 10(b) was
251.

Id. at 863.

252. Id. at 862.
253. Id. at 855.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 856. Judge Waterman also made some pertinent observations concerning the
purpose of an enforcement proceeding and the scope of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws.
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common
law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interest of broader
protection for the investing public ....
Absent any clear indication of a legislative intention to require a showing of

specific fraudulent intent, [citation omitted] the securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law [footnote omitted] both to effectuate
the broad remedial design of Congress, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, [citation omitted] and to insure uniformity of enforcement [citation
omitted].
Id. at 854-55 (emphasis added). Note the contrary position Judge Waterman takes to Justice
Powell with respect to interpretation of legislative intent. See notes 186-92 and accompanying text supra. It is also interesting to compare Judge Waterman's position with the Second
Circuit's disinclination to "believe that the scienter required for Rule lOb-5 aider-abettor
liability, see Ernst& Ernst . . . ;Lanza v. Drexel, [citations omitted], is present where, as
here, the defendant entertains a reasonable belief that all the facts have been fully disclosed." Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977).

intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.' '256 Yet, a
latter-day reading of the pertinent portion of Judge Friendly's concurrence reveals that he was disquieted by Rule lOb-5(2) and, more particularly, its potential application in damage actions against the corporate
respondent and others similarly situated. 257 While he understood section
17(a)(2) of the '33 Act (on which lOb-5(2) was modeled) to warrant
258
imposition of liability in damages "for negligent misrepresentation,''
he was "not convinced that . . . liability for damages under Rule lOb5(2), absent a scienter requirement, .
would not go beyond the
authority vested in the Commission by § 10(b) ....
259 This reservation, however, is not part of the holding, since Judge Friendly recognized
that the TGS issue was "the different one of an injunction.' '260 Although
obviously doubtful that the equities would warrant injunctive relief, he
joined in the remand for consideration of whether "there is equity in..
261
the bill.'
In SEC v. Dolnick,262 defendant was charged under sections 5 and
17(a) of the '33 Act and Rule lOb-5 with participating in a distribution of
unregistered securities by making material misrepresentations. He maintained that he could not be held subject to the "antifraud" provisions
absent SEC proof that he had spoken with willful or reckless disregard for
the truth. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, citing a section 17(a)
decision, 263 disagreed. Without extended discussion it declared that it
would be no defense to a petition for injunction that defendant uttered
admittedly false statements without knowledge of the facts or intent to
omit material facts. 264
256. 425 U.S. at 197.
257. 401 F.2d at 867.
258. Id. Apparently Justice Powell's approving references in Ernst & Ernst to Judge
Friendly's concurrence in TGS were not persuasive to the Seventh Circuit and one judge in
the Southern District of California. See note 78 supra.
259. 401 F.2d at 868.
260. Id.
261.
262.
263.

401 F.2d at 869.
601 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974).
SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966).

264.

Shortly after Ernst & Ernst was decided, the Seventh Circuit handed down its

decision in Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976), in which it appeared

that the Seventh Circuit had given only grudging assent to the stricter standard of culpability, even in a private damage action brought under Rule lOb-5. Interpreting the Supreme

Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst in the broadest possible manner the Court stated that
grossly negligent and wanton conduct would suffice to impose liability under the Rule. 535
F.2d at 995-96.
Subsequently, however, in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir.
1977), a private damage action brought pursuant to various sections of the '33 Act and '34
Act, including § 17(a), § 10(b), and Rule lOb-5, the Seventh Circuit retreated from this
position. The court stated,
The definition of 'reckless behavior' should not be a liberal one lest any discernible distinction between 'scienter' and 'negligence' be obliterated for these purposes. We believe 'reckless' in these circumstances comes closer to being a lesser
form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence. We perceive it
to be not just a difference in degree, but also in kind.

Prior to Ernst & Ernst, it seems that only the Sixth Circuit required
proof of more than mere negligence to sustain an enforcement proceeding. In context of maneuvers by a corporate officer to obtain a favorable
rating from an independent credit rater to accommodate sale of corporate
notes, the court in SEC v. Coffey 265 declared that plaintiff's proof of
defendant's willful or reckless disregard for truth was the proper standard
266
for assessing liability for injunctive relief.
Before passing to decisions subsequent to Ernst & Ernst, it should
be noted that other forms of equitable relief are available to lOb-5
plaintiffs. Thus, in TGS various individual defendants (other than the
company) were required to disgorge profits derived from taking advantage of inside information. 267 Indeed, recognizing that investors as well
as TGS were victims, the court fashioned an order that provided for a
restitution fund that would be held available to investor-claimants for five
years, after which period any unclaimed balance would go to the company. 268 Obviously, availability of not only injunctive, but also ancillary
relief under lOb-5 will be affected by Ernst & Ernst.
D.

Decisions Subsequent to Ernst & Ernst

After the Ernst & Ernst decision, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 269
was the first reported case to squarely address the lOb-5 negligence issue
in context of an SEC enforcement proceeding. 27 0 Bausch & Lomb is one
Id. at 793. It is unclear whether, in view of this decision, the Seventh Circuit will move to
eliminate negligence as a basis of liability in enforcement proceedings.
265. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
266. Id. at 1314. The court reached this conclusion by reference to Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973), which was a private damage action brought
pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. Except for rejecting the analysis of the Second
Circuit in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), the court did not discuss those
Second Circuit cases that indicated that negligence was the proper standard of culpability in
an enforcement proceeding.
267. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
268. Id. at 1307-08.
269. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)[hereinafter referred to as Bausch & Lomb].
270. Prior to Bausch & Lomb, decisions in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York stated, in dictum, that negligence was a sufficient basis for liability in an enforcement
proceeding. In Commodity Futures Trading v. J.S. Love & Assoc., 422 F. Supp. 652
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sued a seller of
commodity options and a corporate vice president seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions for violations of the antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1970).
Pursuant to § 4e(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, the CFTC adopted antifraud rule
30.02, 17 C.F.R. § 30.02 (1977), which provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly,
(a) To cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud any other person;
(b) To make or cause to be made to any other person any false report or
statement thereof or to enter or cause to be entered for any person any false
record thereof;
(c) To deceive or attempt to deceive any other person by any other means
whatsoever in regard to any such account, an agreement or transaction or the
disposition or execution of any such account, agreement or transaction or in
regard to any act of agency performed with respect to such account, agreement or
transaction . . ..

of the country's largest manufacturers of optical products. The SEC
alleged that in the spring of 1972, Daniel G. Schuman, Chairman of the
Board, selectively leaked non-public information to analysts in various
meetings. The SEC also alleged that in one instance Schuman leaked
specific earnings information to an analyst and a random selection of
people prior to the information's general release.
The decision by Judge Ward of the Southern District of New York
was adverse to SEC in several respects. Interpreting Ernst & Ernst to
require proof of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, the court found
that SEC had failed in this respect. Another aspect of the opinion that was
adverse to the SEC, and which may avoid reversal even if the Second
Circuit disagrees on the substantive issue, relates to the equity of granting
an injunction. 271 Judge Ward reasoned,

Argument drawing upon the words of § 10(b) and the history,
legislative and administrative, of both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
27 2 to private suits and actions brought by the
applies
equally
Commission.
He further stated that Ernst & Ernst foreclosed the "policy considerations" formerly used to distinguish enforcement proceedings from private
damage actions under Rule 1Ob-5 .273 Reciting part of a footnote to Justice
Powell's opinion, 27 4 Judge Ward concluded that the Supreme Court had
In determining that negligence would be a proper basis of liability under CFTC rule
30.02, the court analogized to cases decided under Rule lOb-5. It declared,
This conclusion is supported by analogy to SEC Rule lOb-5 which, in enforcement proceedings for equitable and prophylactic relief, proscribes negligent
conduct consisting of failure to disclose material facts, when there is reason to
know the truth. See SEC v. Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); Gross v.
SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
[citations omitted]; SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). Cf. SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096-97 (2d Cir.
1972). Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held under Rule lOb-5 that brokers and
salesmen have a duty to customers to investigate to determine an 'adequate basis
for the opinions. . . render[ed]. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969).
422 F. Supp. at 660.
In SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York stated in dictum that negligence was a proper basis for
liability in an SEC enforcement proceeding. Defendants in Galaxy Foods were selling
franchises in a home delivery service of supermarket items. The SEC charged defendants
with numerous material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the sale of
these franchises. The cases was brought under.§ 17(a) and Rule lOb-5.
Without citing Ernst & Ernst, the Court observed,
While negligence alone suffices as a standard for liability in enforcement
proceedings, SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v.
ManorNursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanley v. SEC,
415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969), the misrepresentation and omissions found here
were made or withheld either with actual knowledge or with reckless disregard for
the truth.
Id. at 1245-46.
Inasmuch as both cases were decided after Ernst & Ernst, the courts' reference to
cases that clearly hold that negligence is a proper basis for liability in an enforcement
proceeding tacitly assumes the principle enunciated in these decisions is still valid.
271. 420 F. Supp. at 1244.
272. Id. at 1241.
273. Id.
274. As we find the language and history of 10(b) dispositive of the appropriate
standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine the additional considerations

considered and rejected any policy arguments that favored retention of a
negligence standard as a basis of liability in 1Ob-5 enforcement proceedings.
It is difficult to quarrel with Judge Ward's perception of Justice
Powell's unfortunate and sweeping language. It is obvious, however, that
neither legal nor policy considerations of the 1Ob-5 standard in equity
were or could have been exhausted by the parties' arguments in a damage
action. This was, of course, implicit in Justice Powell's reservation as to
the role, if any, of scienter in injunctive proceedings. Nonetheless, at the
time of writing, at least one other district court judge has held that SEC
275
must prove intent to defraud.
Three months after the Bausch & Lomb decision, the Second Circuit
indicated that negligence could be a basis for liability in 1Ob-5 enforcement proceedings. In SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.276 the
ultimate question was whether general counsel to Universal Major Industries (UMI) had aided and abetted the company in selling unregistered
stock in violation of section 5 of the '33 Act. 277 In concluding that
defendant counsel was an aider and abettor, the Second Circuit favorably
considered its line of decisions that declared that enforcement actions
could be prosecuted on allegations of defendant's negligence without
27
proof of intent to defraud. 1
Citing a footnote to Justice Powell's opinion, 279 defendant advanced
the alternative arguments that there should not be liability for an aiding and
abetting violation of the securities laws or, if such liability exists, it must
be based upon proof of intent to defraud, deceive, or manipulate rather
than upon mere negligence. Judge Van Graafeiland, writing for the Second
280
Circuit, rejected each of defendant's arguments.
The judge declared that, in view of the broad remedial purposes of
the securities laws, there are "compelling reasons" 21 to retain the
concept of secondary liability for violations of the registration provisions.
of policy, set forth by the parties [that may have influenced the lawmakers] ....
425 U.S. 214 n.33.
420 F. Supp. at 1241. The bracketed language was omitted by the district court.
275. SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977).
276. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
278. 546 F.2d at 1047.
279. Footnote seven to the majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst reads, in pertinent part,
as follows:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required
for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil
liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor
the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action.
425 U.S. 185, 192 (1976).
280. 546 F.2d at 1047-48. Defendant also made the argument that "courts should not
seek to eliminate negligent behavior by enjoining against it, because, by definition, negligence is inadvertent and unintended." Id. at n. I. The court did not address this argument
directly but contented itself with the statement, "(W]e are sure, however, that these
considerations were not overlooked by the prior panels whose holdings we follow." Id. See
also SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (Ist Cir. 1976).
281. 546 F.2d at 1046.

Noting that the essence of section 5 of the '33 Act2 82 would be lost if the
only person subject to liability was the individual who actually consummated the sale, Judge Van Graafeiland denied that the Supreme Court
could have intended that "those who play an indispensable role in the sale
. . . should not be subject to SEC initiated injunctive restraint."283 He
reasoned further that Ernst & Ernst did not require the Second Circuit to
overrule its earlier decisions that held injunctive relief appropriate against
aiders and abettors of securities law violations and he expressly refused to
do so.

28

Citing the cases used to buttress the proposition that injunctive relief
was appropriate against aiders and abettors, 28 5 Judge Van Graafeiland
unequivocably formulated the law of the Second Circuit as follows: "in
SEC proceedings seeking equitable relief, a cause of action may be
predicated upon negligence alone, and scienter is not required.' '286 He
distinguished Ernst & Ernst on the ground that it was a private suit for
damages. In Universal Major Industries Corp., however, the scienter
standard might have been satisfied, since the district court found that
defendant counsel acted with knowledge of the illegal activity or in
28 7
reckless disregard of the truth.

Although the Court's discussion of negligence under lOb-5 was not
essential to the UMI decision, Judge Van Graafeiland left no doubt that,
for at least one Second Circuit panel, negligence suffices as a basis of
liability in SEC enforcement actions. Furthermore, since the cases that
were cited as precedent for this position were decided before Ernst &
Ernst and involved violations of Rule lOb-5 ,288 it seems quite evident
that at least the same panel is likely to hold that not only intentional, but
also negligent uses of deceptive devices are an appropriate basis for
liability in SEC lOb-5 enforcement proceedings.
In SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc. 289 the First Circuit held that
282. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
283. 546 F.2d at 1046.
284. The court cited, as a basis for this conclusion, SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) and SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973),
both of which involved violations of Rule lOb-5. 546 F.2d at 1046-47. This decision should
encourage the SEC, which apparently entertained doubts about continued viability of the
aiding and abetting doctrine after the Ernst & Ernst decision. In his memorandum about
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, SEC General Counsel urged all staff counsel to -[a]void
'aiding and abetting' allegations and instead allege that defendant 'directly or indirectly'
violated the statute or that a defendant 'participated' in a violation .... ." SEC General
Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 254 SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
F-1, F-3 (May 26, 1976). While this approach may help the SEC win some cases at the
district court level, it does not forthrightly advance the opinion that the concept of secondary liability is clear in, and should be retained under, the federal securities laws.
285. 546 F.2d at 1046.
286. Id. at 1047 (emphasis added). This is the statement of law upon which SEC based
its Motion for Summary Reversal in Bausch & Lomb. Memorandum in Support of Motion
at 8-9, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
287. 546 F.2d at 1047.
288. See note 284 supra.
289. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).

intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is not necessary to an SEC
enforcement action that alleges violation of Rule 1Ob-5. Defendant, an
evangelical religious organization, was selling notes to accommodate
construction of a new cathedral and neighboring community. Proceeding
under section 17(a) of the '33 Act and Rule lOb-5, the Commission
charged that defendant made material misrepresentations in advertisements that promoted its "Christian Loan Plans.' '290 Although the district
court found that SEC had made a prima facie showing of violation and
likelihood that they would continue in the future, it refused to grant a
preliminary injunction. The SEC appealed and the First Circuit reversed.
Once again absence of an intent to deceive came into question.
Writing for the court, Judge Aldrich opined,
From the standpoint of the SEC injunction against violations
which the Court finds are likely to persist, a defendant's state
of mind is irrelevant. If proposed conduct is objectively within
the Congressional definition of injurious to the public, good
faith, however much it may be a defense to a private suit for
past actions, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, ... should
make no difference. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Inc.,

[citation omitted].Even those courts that correctly anticipated
the Hochfelder outcome and required proof of scienter in private damage actions under Rule lOb-5, see, e.g., Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 2 Cir., 1973, . . . have not considered intent
relevant in SEC injunction actions, see, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 2

.An injunction is designed to protect the public
Cir. 1974 .....
against conduct not to punish a state of mind [footnote omitted]
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 1944, 321 U.S. 321,

219.291

Since section 17(a) of the '33 Act was pleaded, the court was spared from
deciding what the result would be under l0b-5 standing alone. Judge
Aldrich found it "implausible" 292 that "Congress intended to provide a
mechanism for. . . SEC to protect the public from the injurious schemes
of those of evil intent and yet leave the public prey to the same conduct
perpetrated by the careless or reckless." 293 Thus, not unlike the approach
employed for several years in the Second Circuit, the First Circuit
emphasized the divergent functions of SEC enforcement proceedings and
private damage actions. Whatever merit there is in the position that intent
should be a required element in private damage actions brought under the
Rule, this court concluded that such a requirement contradicts the purpose
of enforcement proceedings-to protect the public interest. 2 4
290. Id. at 539. The SEC alleged that defendant made statements in advertisements
promoting these investment plans to the effect that it was well able to generate enough
revenue to meet all principal and interest payments on the notes, provide funds for the
construction of the religious community, and still have enough money left over to propogate
the faith. In fact, defendant was operating at a deficit; this deficit was increasing annually,
and ability to generate revenue meant that it was able to borrow to repay matured indebtedness. It is interesting to note that shortly after this decision was handed down, defendant
filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition.
291. 544 F.2d at 540-41 (citations and footnotes omitted).
292. Id. at 541 n.10.
293. Id.
294. Justice Blackmun made a similar argument in his dissent to Ernst & Ernst, 425

Since injunctive relief can be granted only after a determination that
defendant's conduct violates Rule 10b-5 and there is reasonable likelihood that such conduct will continue in the future, Judge Aldrich observed that defendant's "demonstrated intent to continue evidences at the
least, an intent to do what [it] now know[s] a federal court, as well as the
SEC, has found deceptive.'"'29 If this is a valid approach, it would
provide a basis for use of the recklessness element, which Justice Powell
implicitly endorses as an alternative to the intent requirement. 2 96 It
would, however, blur the formal distinction between the substantive
determination that a violation has been committed, which permits exercise of the injunction power, and the subsequent discretionary determination as to whether injunction is appropriate.
Other district courts have addressed the appropriate standard of
culpability in enforcement proceedings. In SEC v. Geotek, 297 the court
afforded SEC a momentary thrill,298 but seemingly, there is little that is
compelling about the decision. SEC proceeded under section 17(a) of the
'33 Act and Rule 1Ob-5, alleging material misrepresentations by Geotek
and its principal in connection with certain documents used to promote
its oil and gas exploration ventures. The SEC also made an aiding and
abetting allegation against Messrs. Arthur Young & Company, who
had been retained to audit Geotek's books. Unlike Messrs. Ernst & Ernst,
the Messrs. Young were alleged to have materially misrepresented and
omitted material information in its certifications.
The district court recognized that the Ernst & Ernst decision expressly avoided considering the standard of culpability in SEC enforcement
actions. Reviewing case law predating Ernst & Ernst, the court recognized that the majority of decisions had accepted negligence as a proper
standard of culpability in enforcement proceedings.299 Based solely on its
brief review of prior case law, the court resolved to apply the "strict
U.S. 185, 215-18 (1976)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Given equity's historical purpose to
protect rather than to punish, the argument becomes even more powerful.
It is also interesting to note that, despite the Ernst & Ernst decision, the First Circuit
did not find the language and history of the statute and the rule dispositive in reaching the
conclusion that it was "implausible" that Congress did not intend to provide some means of
redress for negligent violations of the securities laws.
295. 544 F.2d at 541.
296. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
297. 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
298. SEC General Counsel's Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 354
SEC. REG. & L. REP. F-I n.3 (May 26, 1976).
299.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder, the degree of
culpability required to establish liability in a 10(b)/10b-5 SEC enforcement action
was established by a majority of cases to be 'negligence' or the 'lack of due
diligence.' SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1977). Contra, SEC v. Coffey,
493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1973).
426 F. Supp. at 726.

standard of negligence (i.e., ordinary care or due diligence) as to all SEC
claims against defendants. '" 3° Because of the court's ultimate findings,
however, this decision was relegated to the status of dictum.
After examining the various allegations against the two defendants,
the court found that Geotek's principal had not only violated the securities
laws, but had also acted with "scienter" within the meaning of Ernst &
Ernst.30 1 In contrast there was not a "scintilla" of evidence that defendant's auditors had intentionally violated the securities laws, and therefore,
30 2
they were not found to have failed a "strict" standard of negligence.
The other district court that decided an enforcement case was not as
favorable to SEC. The SEC alleged in SEC v. American Realty Trust,3 °3
an action brought under section 17(a) and Rule 1Ob-5, that defendant
made certain material misstatements and omissions in a prospectus relating to the sale of certain subordinated debentures. Employing an approach similar to Judge Ward's in Bausch & Lomb,4 the court declared
that the Ernst & Ernst decision mandated that scienter be established
before an injunction could issue. 305 Because the court had dismissed all
policy considerations in Ernst & Ernst, the district court opined that
policy considerations were no longer of any importance in equitable
30 6
proceedings either.
In any event, two circuit courts of appeals have quite clearly chosen
to retain a negligence standard in lOb-5 enforcement cases. 307 Only the
district courts in Bausch & Lomb and American Realty Trust felt compelled by Ernst & Ernst to adopt a higher standard of culpability for
enforcement proceedings. Validity in the Southern District of New York
of Bausch & Lomb's substantive teaching is doubtful, however, because
of the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in Universal MajorIndustries.308 Nevertheless, Judge Ward's attention to the equities in Bausch &
Lomb may well preclude reversal. Furthermore, his decision may be
misconstrued as the law of the Second Circuit.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 729.
302. Id. at 730.
303. 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977).
304. See notes 272-75 and accompanying text supra.
305. 429 F. Supp. at 1172.
306. Id. at 1170-71. In a stunning sequence of illogic, the court also stated that because
§ 10(b) and § 17(a) contain somewhat similar language, the Ernst & Ernst decision also
mandates that scienter must now be an element of proof under § 17(a). Apparently this court
failed to appreciate the following considerations: the difference between § 17(a), which is a
statute, and 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated pursuant to a statute; the significance of the
Supreme Court's analysis of the language "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance;" and the fact that this language does not appear in § 17(a)(2), which section clearly
imposes liability for negligence.
307. SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1 st Cir. 1976). See notes 276-96 and accompanying
text supra.
308. See notes 276-88 and accompanying text supra.

In each opinion that has been favorable to retention of a negligence
standard, the Supreme Court's reservations and the general purpose and
policy of enforcement proceedings were considered. The analyses have
approximated Judge Waterman's reasoning in the TGS decision. 3°9 Although appropriate, a simple polling of decisions is obviously not dispositive of the issue in this or any other area. The question remains: what
elements of proof should petitioners be required to adduce in an enforcement proceeding? The authors believe that, despite rhetorical excesses in
Ernst & Ernst, negligent performance of a defined public duty (i.e.,
avoidance of the use of deceptive devices including material misrepresentations) should remain a basis of liability in enforcement actions. 310 On a
policy basis, however, they do not believe that proof of the use of a
deceptive device should shift the burden of proving due diligence to
defendants similar to sections 11, 12(2), and 15 of the '33 Act or as
3 11
suggested by the TGS decision.
VI.

The Future of Enforcement Actions
The authors believe that Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder was wrongly
decided. In its zeal to limit access of private parties to federal courts and
to prevent professionals and experts from being subjected to what are
speculatively enormous money damages, 31 2 the Supreme Court took the
unwarranted step of explicitly eliminating negligent use of misleading
devices as a basis for private damage actions under Rule lOb-5. Neither
the result achieved nor the usual methods of analyzing regulatory expressions mandates this conclusion.
A substantial argument can be presented that the unvarnished words
"manipulative and deceptive device or contrivance" and "use" contained in section 10(b) are at least as dispositive of the scienter question as
the words "in connection with the purchase or sale" were of the standing
issue resolved in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 313 Yet, in
Blue Chip, the Court devoted a substantial portion of the opinion to
articulating policy reasons why only actual purchasers or sellers of the
securities in question should be permitted to recover damages under lOb5. In contrast, the Court in Ernst & Ernst did not deign to even reach
309. See notes 250-61 and accompanying text supra.
310. At the very least, it seems that gross neglect will suffice when the Supreme Court
reviews Rule lOb-5 in equity.
311. See notes 62-64 and note 252 and accompanying text supra.
312. The SEC views this case as another in a line of recent Supreme Court decisions
that evince a trend to limit private parties' access to the federal courts. Further, SEC asserts
that the spectre of imposing potentially unlimited monetary damages on professionals and
experts for advice was another exceptionally influential factor in the Court's decision. SEC
General Counsel's Memorandum RegardingErnst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 354 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. F-2, F-3 (May 26, 1976). This analysis is supported by the Court's otherwise
unnecessary and inappropriate quotation of Judge Cardozo's concern about liability in an
indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class. 425 U.S. 214-15 n.33. See notes 226-29 and
accompanying text supra.
313. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).

policy considerations. 314 Like it or not, Ernst & Ernst is very much a
"policy decision," although it is awkwardly disguised in the clothes of
strict construction.
Under similar circumstances in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven &
Co. ,315 Judge Cardozo did not hold that the common law cause of action
failed to provide a basis for liability in all such cases. Rather, because
plaintiffs were unforeseeable, liability could not be imposed under a
negligence theory as such. Even his substitution of "at least" gross
neglect for scienter in the fraud equation depended for its vitality on
definition of to whom the duty ran. 316 Recognizing that plaintiffs in Ernst
& Ernst were not foreseeable by defendant auditors, SEC advanced a
similar theory that was summarily rejected by the Court3 17 as it moved,
almost recklessly, to the issue whether scienter is necessary to characterize what is deceptive. As SEC suggested, the consequences of deceptive conduct do not depend on whether its cause was intentional or
negligent, and the language of section 10(b) does not mandate such a
distinction. Negligent breach of a public duty that gives rise to liability
for damages should not have been read out of section 10(b). Some
remedy was necessary, however, to avoid ungoverned abuse of the
courts. Ultramares provided a resolution by way of the duty analysis that
also appeared in the SEC brief, which Justice Powell scorned.
While Ernst & Ernst is now the law for private damage actions
under lOb-5, there is no reason why its rationale must be adopted in
enforcement actions. Reasons for this conclusion have been noted. First,
there is a basic difference between the purpose of a private damage action
that seeks redress, which in effect may punish, and an equity action that
seeks to acquit a public policy and avoid injustice. The substantive
standard of culpability can be lower in enforcement proceedings brought
under Rule lOb-5 than in private damage actions without undue prejudice
to defendants because trial courts, even when satisfied that the statute has
3 18
been violated, must determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate.
The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst acknowledged this distinction
by citing SEC v. CapitalGains Research Bureau, Inc. 3 19 when it reserv314. 425 U.S. 185, 214-16 n.33 (1976). It is the authors' position that examination of
policy considerations would demand retention, not elimination, of negligence as an element
of proof that can be substituted for intent to deceive.
315.

255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).

316. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. See notes 33-41 and accompanying text supra.
317. In Ernst & Ernst, the SEC proposed that civil liability for negligent violation of
Rule lOb-5 be restricted to situations in which
(i) the defendant knew or reasonably could foresee that the plaintiff would
rely on his conduct,
(ii) the plaintiff did in fact so rely, and
(iii) the amount of the plaintiff's damages caused by the defendant's conduct
was definite and ascertainable.
425 U.S. at 198 n.18.
318. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
319. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

ed the question of whether proof of scienter is required in enforcement
proceedings. 320 In CapitalGains plaintiffs alleged that respondent investment advisor engaged in scalping 32 1 in violation of section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.322 One of the questions raised was
whether SEC's burden of proof included intent to injure defendant's
clients. The Supreme Court held that it did not, stating that scalping was
itself a practice that operated as a fraud or deceit. Writing for the Court,
Justice Goldberg stated that a "fundamental purpose" of the "series" of
federal securities laws was substitution of "a philosophy of full disclosure for caveat emptor . . . thus to achieve a high standard of ethics in
the securities industry. "323 He concluded that, in view of this remedial
purpose, 324 it "is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic
relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages. ' '9325
To be sure, Capital Gains grew out of a fiduciary relationship of
326
sorts between adviser and client and, thus, can be distinguished.
Justice Goldberg, however, anticipated this when he discussed the broader justification for equitable relief and referred to the congressional intent
that the Investment Advisers Act be "construed like other securities
legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding fraud,' not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose. '327
320. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
321. As used here, "scalping" refers to accumulating securities, tipping them as a buy,
and finally selling them at an appreciated price presumably enhanced by the tip.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1940) [hereinafter referred to as section 206]. Section 206 states
in pertinent part,
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to
or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the
account of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the
completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shall
not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker
or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
paragraph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative.
Subsection (4) was added after suit commenced in Capital Gains Research.
It is important that respondent had omitted to tell his clients of his purchases and that
neither subsection (1) nor (2) nor the later enacted subsection (4) reads squarely on omissions.
323. 375 U.S. at 186 (footnote omitted).
324. Id. at 195.
325. Id. at 193.
326. "Nor is it necessary in a suit against a fiduciary, which Congress recognized the
investment adviser to be, to establish all of the elements required in a suit against a party to
an arm's-length transaction." Id. at 194.
327. Id. at 195 (footnote omitted).

Capital Gains suggests that failure to disclose a material fact can
operate as a "fraud" under section 206 even though the adviser did not
intend to harm his clients and they experienced no harm. To be sure, there
is no damage without injury, but certainly the substance of the prohibited
conduct does not change thereby. SEC seeks injunctions to protect rather
than to punish. Therefore, if negligent discharge of the duty owed clients
is a sufficient basis of liability under section 206, there is no reason why
the same considerations and standard of liability should not be applicable
to negligent performance of a public duty to avoid use of deceptive
devices.
A second reason to retain negligence as a standard of liability in SEC
enforcement proceedings under lOb-5 can be found in language in sections 10(b) and 21(d) of the '34 Act that has often been overlooked.
Section 10(b) states that the SEC shall promulgate rules "as necessary
and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."' 328 Section 21(d) authorizes SEC to proceed when it perceives
that someone "is engaged or about to engage in acts or practices" in violation of the Act. 329 In contrast with the public prosecution provisions,
neither section 10(b) nor 21(d) expressly deals with the actor's state of
mind.
Texas Gulf Sulphur,330 Management Dynamics ,331 and World
Radio Mission332 emphasized that SEC does not appear as an ordinary
litigant. Rather, it is the "l[s]tatutory guardian charged with safeguarding
the public interest,- 333 and the injunction it seeks "is designed to protect
the public against conduct not to punish a state of mind."334 Certainly the
Supreme Court will concede that investors may suffer injury as a result of
negligent breach of the duty to avoid use of deceptive devices. If SEC, by
enforcement actions, can prevent further injury to the public from such
conduct, its procedures will apparently comport fully with what Congress
intended when it gave the SEC the right to draft rules "in the public
interest" and to proceed against those "about to" violate substantive
provisions. While private petitioners do not fall within the express language of section 21(d), it seems that their burdens of establishing membership in a protected class and the threat of irreparable harm should
suffice to let them proceed in equity against negligent breaches of the
duty to avoid uses of deceptive devices.
It is the authors' position that these reasons outweigh any argument
that can be made for imposing a scienter requirement similar to Ernst &
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
omitted).

See note I supra (emphasis added).
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976) (footnote

Ernst upon enforcement proceedings. Restraint from such imposition will
not overburden the federal courts with numerous litigants. Experts would
not be subjected to potentially enormous money damages. The SEC
would only be doing what Congress created it for: protecting the public.
Individual investors could protect themselves rather than rely on bureaucratic difficulties in assigning priorities.
VII.

Conclusion
The authors, running somewhat against the tide, find the language of
section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 relatively clear and forthright. This is
particularly true when these provisions are considered in context of the
33 5
"jurisprudence" of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
They believe that retaining negligence as a basis of liability for actions in
equity under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would be completely consistent with the legislative purpose of protecting investers from overreaches, whether or not intentional, by those who enjoy superior bargaining positions or data bases and who voluntarily place themselves in a
position of responsibility for the publicly disseminated information.
They do not endorse all Rule lOb-5 damage decisions predating
Ernst & Ernst and condemn those in which, even assuming material
misrepresentation, duty and causation analyses were abridged.
They are not impressed with catastrophe arguments and do not
believe that liability in indeterminate amounts for indeterminate periods
to indeterminate classes of plaintiffs will eventuate if the duty analysis is
as rigorously pursued as it was in Ultramares.
They are disturbed by the Supreme Court's approach to identifying
practices that are deceptive by looking to the user's state of mind and are
concerned lest this concept be taken as meaningful outside of the context
of Rule lOb-5 damage actions and cause great mischief.
As for professionals, the authors believe that another of Judge
Friendly's observations is appropriate not only to the criminal prosecution
he addressed, but also to civil proceedings:
[C]ongress . . . could not have intended that men holding
themselves out as . . . [professionals] . . . should be able to
escape . . . liability on a plea of ignorance when they shut their
eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
33 6 represented a
knowledge they knew they did not possess.
In any case, Ernst & Ernst states the law of damage actions under
Rule lOb-5, and, as to them, defendant's intent to deceive is part of
plaintiff's case. Whether or not scienter, so defined, is imposed on l Ob-5
equity petitioners, the authors anticipate that "recklessness" will be
335. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1970).
336. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964). Hopefully, denial of
certiorari in United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976) betokens a similar attitude. See note 225 supra.

allowed to substitute for "intent to deceive" and that, for a decade
thereafter (unless Rule 10-5 is refined), great games
will be played as to
3 37
when neglect crosses the line into recklessness.

337. See Bartels v. Algonquin, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,870 (D.C. Vt. 1977), in which the court held that plaintiff's allegations that defendants
acted "recklessly, wantonly and/or willfully" sufficiently pleaded scienter.
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